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Chapter I
CREATION AND BEGINNINGS, 1917-1920
Major General J.F.C. Fuller makes the observation in Tanks in
the Great War , that the giving of blows without receiving them
remains the unchanging object of battle irrespective of the change
of weapons; and as the European battlefield became stalemated, the
search for a new weapon with which to break through the enemy's
front lines began in earnest. Previous conflicts, particularly the
Russo-Japanese War, hinted at the deadly firepower of the machine
gun, but it took the mowing down of the tightly packed masses of men
advancing across the shelterless no-man's land to illustrate that
lesson to all. The machine gun gave the defense too much of an
advantage over the offense, and with the static frontline a new
solution was sought to bring mobility and decision to the
battlefield. Poison gas and the "walking barrage" were two methods
employed to break the stalemate, but they did not produce the
decisive effect necessary to restore mobility to the battlefield.
Another line of thinking evolved from the concept of armored
knights. Armor plate was a viable counter to machine gun and small
arms fire. Soldiers might be able to advance through machine gun
fire if they wore fitted suits of armor or carried a large armor
plate to use as a bullet proof shield. But, not unlike medieval
knights, the addition of armor seriously restricted mobility or
proved to be too heavy to carry and thus, impractical. When sheer
muscle fails, man turns to mechanical means to achieve his goal—and
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in this case the solution was the internal combustion engine.
By adding armor plate and machine guns to cars, a machine with
armor protection, firepower and mobility could be produced. Wheeled
armor cars lacked the mobility to traverse the rough and often muddy
terrain, barbed wire obstacles, and trench systems of World War I
battlefields. The problem of maneuvering across shell torn ground
was solved by adopting the Holt caterpillar farm tractor as the
means of locomotion. While Lt. Colonel Ernest D. Swinton receives
most of the credit for conceiving of the idea of the modern tank,
others, such as Rear Admiral R.H.S. Bacon (general manager of the
Coventry Ordnance Works) and Lt. R.F. Mac fie produced similar
designs. It was William Tritton, head of the Foster Engineering
Works at Lincoln, England and Major W.G. Wilson who first success-
fully combined armor, caterpillar traction and gasoline engines into
an employable weapon. Their design, "Mother," met the War Office
requirements of being able to cross a five foot trench and surmount
four and a half foot parapets, and was standardized as Tank MK I.
The strategic idea behind the tank was to employ them as
breakthrough weapons to breach the German lines. Tactically, tanks
provided the infantry with a means to neutralize hostile fire and to
create a pathway through wire entanglements. Once the machine guns
and obstacles were eliminated, the large body of infantry following
the tanks would maintain the momentum of the assault and exploit the
breakthrough. Lt. Colonel Swinton was instrumental in developing
the initial tank tactics and wrote extensively on their proper
employment in combat. As in the case with the development of any
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new weapon, before it is tested in actual combat, its proper
employment is hidden by mechanical limitations and handicapped by
the lack of experience of the men in charge.
The initial seeds in British tank doctrine, which would later
be adopted by the Americans, can be found in the objective of the
Admiralty Landships (a naval euphemism for tank) Committee—a device
able to operate on the Western Front battlefields, and help the
infantry break through enemy lines—and the designers' conceptions
of the mechanical means to best achieve those ends. In the transi-
tion from drawing board to reality, Colonel Swinton led the way in
developing tank doctrine because his ideas seemed to best achieve
the intended goals logically and were compatible with the existing
technology. Swinton's ideas were for "caterpillar machine gun
destroyers" to overcome the wire and obstacles and eliminate enemy
machine guns so that the following infantry could exploit the
breakthrough. Thus tanks could restore mobility to the battlefield.
Upon these principles it was decided to manufacture the MK I in two
versions to accomplish two different, but complementary, missions.
The male model was armed with two 2 pounder naval guns and four
machine guns for the purpose of attacking enemy guns, fortifica-
tions, and defenses. The female version was equipped with four
machine guns for anti-personnel fire and to protect male tanks from
infantry attacks.
This brief look at initial British tank doctrine formation also
serves to illustrate the reoccurr ing theme throughout this thesis:
that doctrinal development is a synthesis of ideas from the
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interaction between current doctrine, mental creativity, and
technology. Further, changes in doctrine and the pace at which
technology advances move at different rates of speed. For example,
Colonel Swinton's concepts governing the employment of a caterpillar
machine gun destroyer and the capabilities of the "Mother" tank
moved at relatively the same speed; and each influenced the other as
British tank doctrine was established. With the introduction of the
lighter and faster Whippet and Renault FT tanks later in the war, we
see the pace of technology began to change more rapidly than
doctrine. The example of strategic bombing illustrates how doctrine
developed ahead of technology. While the concept of strategic
bombing was accepted in the 1930s, it was not until the B-29 bomber
was employed with the atomic bomb that technology was able to catch
up with U.S. Army Air Force doctrine. Other factors, such as eco-
nomics, politics, and interservice rivalries are influential in the
determination of doctrine. The exigencies of war often take
priority over economic and political considerations.
For the British, it was the mechanical capabilities and the
conditions of trench warfare that most influenced the development of
tactical doctrine. We have already discussed the conditions present
on the World War I battlefield and the armament of the tanks,
however, little has been said about the mechanics. The MK I tanks
weighed 28 tons (27 for the female version) and were powered by a
105 hp Daimler -Foster gasoline engine, which gave the tank a top
speed of 3.7 mph. 1 This speed made it an excellent infantry weapon
because it moved at the same pace as the footsoldiers. However, the
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heat from the engine room firewall, the poor ventilation of the crew
compartment, and the cramped conditions within led to the exhaustion
of the crew in a matter of hours. Mechanical failures of the engine
or track breakage were common occurrences that caused many to doubt
the reliability of the tank, and thus its utility in general. It
takes actual combat to expose all the "bugs" in a weapon's design.
The tank first received its trial by fire on September 15, 1916
during the battles of the Somme. In retrospect, the initial
engagements provided strong evidence that the tank could be a
practical infantry support weapon for destroying machine guns, but
it also exposed doctrinal shortcomings that resulted in the improper
employment of the tank. Commanders were forced to create a doctrine
for a weapon without being able to conduct exercises or training to
determine its combat characteristics. Mistakes initially made in
employing tanks were a direct result of the strict wartime secrecy
surrounding the invention of a new weapon.
Tanks were organized for combat as brigades or battalions. A
brigade was composed of three battalions of tanks, a signal company,
a supply company and a transportation column. Three companies
formed a battalion. A company's structure depended on the type of
tank with which the unit was equipped. In heavy tank companies
there were four sections of four tanks; medium tank companies
contained an additional section of four tanks. Light tank companies
organized by the U.S. Army contained four "platoons" of five tanks.
Following the British practice one section or platoon was designated
as the reserve/training unit. All tank units formed part of the
General Headquarters Reserve, and were allocated by Armies in
brigade or battalion size units to infantry corps based on the
number of tactical points contained in the operation. Allotted tank
units then came under the authority of the corps commander and
formed part of the corps reserve. This method parcelled out tank
units among infantry divisions as the tactical picture indicated.
Once assigned an objective the details were worked out by the tank
unit commanders in conjunction with the divisional commander.
During an attack the tactical purpose of the tank was to reduce
resistance to the infantry's advance and provide local protection
during the attack. Tanks operated with thirty-five yards to 100
yards between tanks, and 200 yards to 600 yards separating the
attacking waves.
Armor and mobility were seen as the key to restoring maneuver
to the war, and without tank support infantry could not advance on
the World War I battlefield. Commanders, especially infantry
commanders, saw the tank as the weapon to enable foot soldiers to
advance against enemy machine gun fire and obstacles. The tank was
first thought of as a weapon to assist the infantry, and thus
doctrine developed for tanks as an infantry support weapon. Later
when technology produced models with greater speed and radius of
action, it was difficult to dispel the stereotype of the tank as
only an infantry support weapon. The tank became an infantry weapon
because it did not possess the performance characteristics to
accomplish independent operations, but did have the capabilities to
assist the advance of infantry on the World War I battlefield.
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British tank doctrine can be divided into five periods: the
Somme (1916) to Messines (1917), including the actions in Palestine;
the Third Battle of Ypres (1917) to Cambrai; Cambrai (1917) to the
action of Bucquoy; Hamel to the Armistice; the preparations for Plan
1919. 2
The first period was one of great learning. Apart from
mechanical difficulties and natural obstacles, such as mud, there
were many tactical and strategic problems to solve. Contrary to
Colonel Swinton's arguments, tanks were not amassed to deliver a
surprise and decisive blow, but rather they were used in small
numbers, thus reducing the psychological impact of the introduction
of a new weapon to the battlefield. Historian Robin Higham in
studying the weapons policy of the British ridged airships observes
that "weapons may exert a decisive influence for a short time in a
particular struggle or battle, but they are rarely absolute in their
influence. Each new weapon is a challenge which brings its own
response." 3 In the battle of the Somme only forty-nine tanks were
allocated, while a year later at Cambrai nearly 500 tanks par-
ticipated. Whether or not sheer numbers would have been decisive is
hypothetical. During this period, there were too few tanks employed
operational ly.
The British had little strategic success at the Somme and at
other battles during this period because of ". . . the small numbers
of machines used and the lack of continuity of the attacks them-
selves. Tanks were scattered over too wide a front and frittered
away in minor actions.""* This led one author to characterize this
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period as "the piddle method" of tank tactics.
Of the forty-nine tanks allocated for the Somme offensive,
thirty-two arrived at the line of departure, and only nine made it
to attack enemy trenches. These caused considerable damage and
panic among the German troops, thus providing evidence that the tank
with mechanical improvements (such as reliability and operation over
churned up mud) could be a decisive weapon. Another benefit was
that tanks drew fire away from the infantry, which reduced casual-
ties and strengthened the morale of the advancing troops. The
strict secrecy surrounding the tank undermined the effectiveness of
its introduction into combat. Commanders were not able to train
with the weapon so its capabilities remained largely undetermined.
For this reason commanders were not able to understand the true
nature of the tank. This lack of training had detrimental ramifica-
tions on command and control and infantry-tank cooperation.
Evaluating the operation, it became evident that tank crews required
better and more thorough training; tank personnel should reconnoiter
the area before an attack; infantry specially trained in tank
cooperation were necessary for more efficient operations; and
separate supply system to rearm and refuel tanks and conduct salvage
operations should be established. History justifies Colonel
Swinton's argument to only commit tanks in mass. During the battle
of the Somme decisive results were not attained because too few
tanks were employed and none were held as reserves. Prior to the
Ypres offensive, the British did not consolidate tank strength, but
dispersed insignificant numbers of tanks throughout the length of
a
the attack front.
The second period of British tank tactics can be described as
the "muddle method." It was assumed, more along Swinton's lines of
mass employment, that if enough tanks were committed at one time the
German lines would be pierced by the weight of the tank assault.
This strategy was a direct continuation of the war of attrition.
For the Ypres Offensive (July 31, 1917), the British allocated 252
MK IV tanks to support three corps of thirteen divisions, which was
more than three times the tank density at Messines two months
earlier. 3 The time delay between design and actual production
decreased to the point where tanks could be manufactured rapidly.
Between June 7 and July 31 the British replaced combat losses from
the Messines and built up reserves for the offensive at Ypres. It
was hoped that mechanical improvements in the MK IV would help to
bring about victory that tank enthusiasts envisioned.
The argument for better tanks employed in large numbers
prevailed among the senior officers in command. But the substitu-
tion of numbers and relatively minor changes to doctrine did not
compensate for deficiencies that remained in command and control
infantry-tank cooperation, and the supply organization. Flaws in
tactical doctrine led to the failure of the tank attack at Ypres.
Besides relying on sheer numbers to breach the German line, Infantry
commanders were not convinced of the tanks potential and shelling
was considered more beneficial than tanks. A long preliminary
bombardment at Messines was judged to be effective and helpful, so a
ten day bombardment was planned prior to opening the offensive at
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Ypres. The bombardment had only adverse effects on tank effective-
ness. The preliminary bombardment disclosed the intended location
of the attack and forfeited the element of surprise, thus depriving
tanks of their inherent shock value. Secondly, the bombardment
pulverized the terrain over which the tanks would maneuver; and rain
on the first day of the offensive turned the earth into a quagmire.
The Germans tactical response to the preliminary bombardment was to
deploy their lines in depth to reduce the effectiveness of shelling.
This development necessitated better command and control techniques
to govern tanks. Unfortunately, command and control had been
sacrificed in favor of mass. Even though the unfavorable terrain
conditions greatly reduced the tank's tactical mobility, tanks again
demonstrated tactical utility. But because of invalid doctrinal
assumptions, the tank's full strategic potential was hidden by
unimpressive results and was doubted by many British officers. This
pessimistic view was shared by the Germans as well as the American
observers sent to the Western Front. The result was a disillusion-
ment with tanks and the continued expenditure of large amount of
munitions and lives for relatively small gains.
The third period begins with the attack near Cambrai on
November 20, 1917. Other officers, such as Swinton and Major J.F.C.
Fuller, had been advocating different methods governing tank attacks
and finally persuaded the higher command that an assault using
Swinton's original recommendations from February 1916 would succeed.
The changes implemented affected primarily the strategic level of
tank employment. Tank Corps officers continued to improve
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deficiencies in tank doctrine based on experiences in combat. The
planned attack on Cambrai differed significantly from previous tank
operations. Specifically good terrain for tank operations was
chosen before the objective, no long preliminary bombardment was
planned, and the tanks were massed in waves. The preliminary
bombardment was deleted because of its adverse consequences:
pulverizing the ground in the lanes of operation; the dilution of
fire effectiveness resulting from the German deployment in depth;
and surprise gained because previous offensives always began with
intensive shel lings, thus disclosing the point of attack. The tanks
were deployed in massed waves, which gave the commander a partial
reserve instead of all tanks advancing at once in one thin line.
Even though the tank's fate was in question, British production had
remained steady and 378 MK IVs, plus an additional ninety-eight
command tanks participated in the attack.*
The thrust was successful. The Germans were taken by surprise,
and within twelve hours an advance of 12,000 yards on a 13,000 yard
front with only 4,000 casualties had been achieved. These gains
were more rapid and less costly than those of the Somme or Ypres
offensives. The battle established the concept of the tank as a
breakthrough weapon. Yet, the tank failed to achieve what would be
later termed as a follow-up thrust, a complete rupture of enemy
lines. Mechanical weaknesses and flaws remaining in tank doctrine
were responsible. Besides destroying machine guns and firing on
enemy troops, tanks were assigned specific objectives to capture, or
at least to hold until infantry relieved them. Upon gaining an
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objective the tank crew had no motivation or reason to push on. If
a tank commander decided to advance further than ordered, insuffi-
cient supply organization, crew exhaustion, and mechanical unrelia-
bility soon forced a tank to halt.
Cambrai also served as a catalyst for future doctrinal develop-
ment. The heavy MK IVs served to batter their way through a trench
system, but once past those obstacles the open terrain would allow
for a greater rate of movement. There were two views on how to best
exploit the breakthrough. One group advocated using the horse
cavalry in its traditional role; another wanted to incorporate a
smaller and faster experimental tank known as the "Whippet," to
operate in areas behind the trench system.
The British were developing a medium class of lighter tanks
possessing more speed, which enhanced their mobility and tactical
value. The lack of a preliminary bombardment left the road network
intact and available for use by advancing troops after the German
lines were breached. The development of a fast cavalry or pursuit
tank coincided with the establishment of the tank as a breakthrough
weapon at Cambrai. British tank commanders acknowledged the need
for another type of tank with greater speed, and when the Tank Corps
expanded in the fall of 1917, they restructured the battalion to
include 320 MK IV heavy and 50 MK A medium tanks. During the German
offensive of March 1918, the Whippet's speed of 8.3 mph (about
double that of the heavy tanks) proved to be of considerable value
in a mobile battle.
The battle at Cambrai was seen by skeptics as an abnormality in
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the face of so many attacks that only produced marginal results.
The successful surprise attack on July 4th at Hamel vindicated the
idea that tanks were necessary before any assault could succeed.
Hamel and the French attack at Soissons on July 13, 1918 quieted
almost all criticism of employing tanks. In fact, tanks were then
employed in every major attack until the armistice ended the
fighting.
With successful methods of tank employment emerging, the
British (and French) continued to search for the optimal way of
using tanks. The success also forced the Germans to think about
antitank defenses. Initial British mediocrity met with equal
enthusiasm for antitank measures in the German Army. The effec-
tiveness of tanks after Cambrai quickly stimulated German thought,
and they began to develop antitank guns and tanks. The Germans
countered with armor piercing bullets (soon made obsolete by thicker
armor in later models), mines, antitank obstacles (pits, barricades)
and field artillery employed as antitank artillery. Both sides
found direct firing artillery to be the best counter-measure, but,
it reduced the strength of field artillery units for offensive/-
defensive fire missions.
During this fourth period the Tank Corps were still fully
subservient to the infantry assault, but the primitive concept of
tank forces as self-contained fighting units began to evolve. The
British adapted the tank to accomplish other tasks than fire
support. Specialized tanks for mine clearing, f lamethrowing, and
supply were produced in limited numbers. Also, as the front was
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pushed back beyond the range of friendly artillery, fire support was
augmented by 6" mortars mounted on the rear of certain tanks.
Sometimes, attached air units assisted in the discovery and destruc-
tion of antitank guns, and supplied "tactical air support." It
should be remembered that these instances were experimental and
exceptions to the rule; but they illustrate how weapons and ideas
were progressing from a battering ram for the infantry to a more
specialized and complex.
From Hamel to the end of the war, the employment of tanks in
combat entered the last combat tested state of development. The
major difference was the striving to maintain command and control,
and better cohesion in the advance. To avoid tactical degeneration,
phase lines were established from which further advances were
resumed at definite times. 7 A time schedule allowed for some delays
in more difficult sectors, forward movement of supporting artillery,
replenishment of fuel and ammunition, rest for the crews, a con-
tinuation of forward momentum and improved tactical command. While
this method was a step forward it did not solve all the problems.
The timed phase lines deprived tank commanders of the individual
incentive to push into the German rear echelons. Command and
control problems would only be eased through technology years later
with the installation of individual radios in each tank. Another
problem that continued to plague tank actions was that commanders
unwisely handled their reserves and habitually used up local
reserves before it was necessary. Commanders were instilled with
the incorrect belief that an opponent could be overcome by mass
—
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which fit into the mind set of a war of attrition. This frame of
mind and inexperience employing tanks combined to produce mismanage-
ment of tank reserves, and prevented the concentration of forces at
the decisive point at the proper time. While phase lines provided
better command and control, and momentum during the attack, com-
manders continued to commit reserves to battle before it was
necessary.
The fifth period is that of the theoretical thinking of Major
J.F.C. Fuller which would have been tested in Plan 1319 if the war
had continued. Fuller was associated with tanks from early in the
war as part of the Tank Corps Staff. He was also responsible for
working out the plan for the attack at Cambrai. As a theoretician,
Fuller thought along the same lines as Swinton, however, he differed
on the strategic objective of the tank. Even before Cambrai, Fuller
had been promoting the idea of striking at the German headquarters
with a tank raid. By targeting the headquarters Fuller's strategy
was to disrupt German command and control operations, paralyzing and
disorganizing resistance of front line troops. This is exactly what
happened during the attack on Amiens on August 8, 1918.
This strategic concept was the foundation of Plan 1919, which
was an armored offensive on a grand scale. Almost 5,000 tanks would
be concentrated on a ninety mile front to penetrate through the
front lines to a depth of twenty miles, a depth sufficient to dis-
organize the enemy's rear and paralyze his front line. With German
command and control broken, the infantry could advance against a
demoralized enemy. Fuller's ideas were good and his thinking
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correct, but the unreliability of World War I tanks, tactical
command and control problems, and supply difficulties would have
limited the effectiveness of the plan. It is doubtful that a cam-
paign, such as the German invasion in 1940, could have been carried
out. While Fuller's ideas were progressive, his fundamental concept
that mass could overwhelm the German rear was limited by the
capabilities of even the best tank.
American association with tanks began with the United States
Military Mission in Paris sent to observe the European War. Its
initial reports evaluated the unimpressive tank actions during 1916
and early 1917 and helped discourage the idea of establishing a
separate tank service. The tank was seen by the Mission as a mobile
armored machine gun destroyer. Other studies done after America's
entry into the war (and prior to Cambrai) affirmed the same con-
clusion. The General Organization Project for the American Expedi-
tionary Force (A.E.F.) totally disregarded the formation of a tank
service, but it did recommend that one company in each machine gun
battalion be equipped with tanks. • Of the promising designs, most
officers believed that if any tank units were formed they should be
equipped with the British Mk IV s or the French FT models.
The Renault FT was designed by Colonel (later General) J.B.E.
Estienne as a light infantry accompanying tank. Estienne, thinking
along the same lines as Swinton, was France's tank enthusiast. His
design produced a small two man tank equipped with either a 8 mm
machine gun or a 37 mm cannon, and had a speed of 4.8 mph. 10 The
Renault was unique because its armament was mounted in a revolving
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360° turret. French heavy tank designs were a failure because the
designed suspension system and track layout provided very poor
maneuverability on the broken terrain of the Western Front. French
Army doctrine subordinated the tank exclusively to the infantry.
This confined tanks to a limited role of an auxiliary and tended to
focus infantry attention on accompanying tanks—especially the
Renault FT. 11 This was a fundamental difference between French and
British doctrines.
Of the committees established to study British and French
organisation and tactics, the board composed of Colonel Fox Conner,
Colonel Frank Parker, Major Nelson E. Margetto, and Lt. Colonel
Clarence C. Williams was the most influential. Their "Report on
Tanks," submitted on September 1, 1917 identified the tank as an
important future element in war and recommended that U.S. troops be
equipped with Mk VI heavy tanks (upgrade versions of the lik IV) and
Renault FT, procured jointly by the Allies; and be organised with a
separate tank department under the command of a single chief would
who report directly to the Commander-in-Chief, AEF. 12 All recom-
mendations were later adopted by the Army in France.
The American Tank Corps was organized in December 1917 under
the command of Colonel Samuel D. Rockenbach. Was it mere coin-
cidence that the Chief-of-Staf f acted to form an American Tank Corps
within weeks after the stunning "victory" at Cambrai by British
tanks? Prior to that date, tanks were organized as the light and
heavy tank service. Colonel Rockenbach was responsible for organiz-
ing, training, and equipping all tank units in the AEF. He also
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served as advisor to General Pershing on tank matters. From the
Allies experiences and reports by American officers, Rockenbach
decided that tank tactics would support the infantry through the
barbed wire and protect them from rifle and machine gun fire. Tank
units would be organized to allow the men to work in shifts,
providing reliefs for dead, disabled, and exhausted crews. 13 As
commander of the Tank Corps, Rockenbach could not be everywhere at
once, and as his organization grew so did his dependence on his
subordinates. One officer in particular proved himself to be
bright, energetic, innovative, and instrumental in the development
of the Tank Corps—Major George S. Patton Jr.
Patton requested a transfer to the tank service in October,
1917 on advice from General Pershing, to whom Patton was an aide at
the time. Upon assignment, Patten's duties were to organize the
light tank service and to set up training facilities for American
tankers. The light tank service was to be equipped with light tanks
of the French Renault FT design. Since the FT had just appeared,
Patton spent most of November with the French studying the tank and
their training methods. The analogous relationship between the role
of light tanks and cavalry stimulated Pattern's thinking and chal-
lenged the French method of employment.
The Renault FT was designed as an accompanying tank for the
infantry, and doctrine placed it behind the infantry as a mobile
reserve. It was the often long response time between assignment of
a mission and engagement that most disturbed the cavalry-minded
Patton. This sentiment is echoed in many of his writings from the
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World War I period. In any tank action he felt that "tanks like
cavalry must depend on rapidity and shock for success. . . . M1 * He
also opposed the use of tanks as mobile pill boxes fighting in a
solid line along the entire front. The heavy tanks did not possess
the speed to achieve shock action and training continued to follow
British teachings. Because of Pattern's position as commander of the
light tank units, he was able to introduce his ideas into training.
He also instilled discipline, esprit de corps and aggressiveness
among tankers.
Drawing from his observations of the French, Patton formulated
tactics he believed tanks should follow. In a memo to the Chief of
the Tank Service (Rockenbach) , dated December 12, 1317, Patton wrote
that in order to provide aid to the infantry, tanks must: "D
facilitate infantry advance by cutting wires ahead of the infantry;
2) prevent hostile infantry from manning the trench parapet when the
preparatory barrage lifted; 3) prohibit machine guns and trench
cannon from attacking the infantry; 4) help mop up, neutralizing
strongpoints and blockhouses by masking them with fire and smoke
bombs; 5) guard against counterattack by patrolling. . . . " 1S
Patton further added that tanks should "... push on at own
initiative beyond the final objective—but only after infantry
consolidated that position— in order to seek every opportunity for
pursuit. At this phase the support and possibly the reserves should
join the leading tanks." 1 * This memo shows that Patton had grasped
the tactical usefulness of the tank, but as yet had not decided how
tanks in the pursuit of the enemy were to be controlled. The memo,
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written the immediately after Cambrai, seems to put him along the
same lines of thinking as Fuller. Yet Patton's papers fail to
mention contact with J.F.C. Fuller. Most of Patton's papers
regarding tanks deal with tactical employment or strategic mobility
and do not discuss the strategic employment that Fuller visualized
in his Plan 1919. Because of his promotion to Lt. Colonel and com-
mander of the 304th Tank Brigade, Pat ton was able to influence
American light tank doctrine directly.
The major point that Patton stressed was speed and shock action
and operating in the enemy's rear areas. Official memos and
personal letters by Patton often stress these themes. In a memo
from the Headquarters, 1st Tank Center, on bridging trenches, Patton
opened by stating five essential qualities of a tank, the first two
are: "D Mobility of strategic employment, 2) Speed and radius of
action on the battlefield." 17 Given his theories based on speed and
mobility, the Renault FT possessed the necessary capabilities to
test his theories. During the winter of 1917-1918, he started to
develop his theories, and by the spring he was openly arguing that
"... the time has now arrived to divorce tank tactics, at least to
a considerable degree, from the stereotyped formations heretofore
thought essential." 1- Patton envisioned waves of tanks and infantry
"leapfrogging" through enemy defensive lines. The leapfrogging
concept was similar to the childhood game bearing the same name.
The first wave was assigned an objective to capture. The second
(and/or third) wave would use the occupied position as a point from
which to begin operations against its assigned objective deeper in
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enemy territory. When the second wave consolidated its position the
cycle was begun again by the first wave. The typical assault was to
be preceded by a short intensive bombardment of high explosives and
smoke to blind enemy gunners. As soon as the tanks accomplished
their mission of helping the infantry, Patton believed they should
move on immediately. Centers for ammunition, gasoline, and oil
would be established for tanks in enemy territory in order to allow
the advance to continue. Writing to the Deputy Chief of Staff, GHQ,
AEF (May £, 1918) on tank tactics and strategy, Patton expressed his
urgency for tanks to continue forward as soon as possible. When
tanks and infantry halted, the Germans countered with defensive
artillery fire on that position which inflicted casualties. If the
advance was quickly resumed, the German commanders were forced to
think about possible moves instead of shelling the tanks and
infantry at the intermediate objective. 19 Patton saw leapfrogging
also as a method for restoring mobility to the battlefield.
Leapfrogging allowed tanks to be resupplied and offered a short
period of rest for the crews, thus facilitating a continuous line of
assault waves to maintain the momentum of the advance. Patton was
trying to attain decision on the battlefield through the old cavalry
principle of maneuver, rather than overwhelming the Germans by
numbers in a frontal assault. This was the concept that Patton
formulated and intended to use to break through German lines.
American tanks first entered combat on September 12, 1918
during the operation against the St. Mihiel Salient. The tanks
provided much aid to the infantry in the successful action; however,
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senior commanders repeated British mistakes made the year before and
thus greatly reduced the strategic and offensive importance of tank
units. Chief errors included an insufficient number of tanks, a
continuing problem of infantry/tank cooperation, and the employment
of tanks across unsuitable terrain. Mechanical breakdowns, heavy
tank losses, and greater consumption of gasoline owing to mud
further reduced their striking power. Nevertheless, American
infantry and tank commanders did gain their first actual combat
experience.
The St. Mihiel operation was followed shortly by the Meuse-
Argonne offensive that began on September 26, 1918. In America's
biggest operation of the war, better employment of tanks enabled
U.S. forces to overcome heavy German resistance. Tanks were
employed in more favorable terrain, and many of Patton's suggestions
were incorporated into the battle plan. The 344th Tank Battalion
(of the 304th Tank Brigade) was to lead the infantry advance, with
the 34th tank battalion following ready to "leapfrog" and continue
the advance with the infantry. Cooperation between infantry and
tanks was greatly improved and effective, but coordination with
infantry units remained poor. Infantry/tank coordination was
further reduced because command and control of the 304th Tank
Brigade was lost when its commander was wounded. Lt . Colonel
Patton's concept of leading by example put him amongst the front
line troops and in danger. For his actions he received a medal for
valor and a leg wound severe enough to remove him from the bat-
tlefield. Patton served as the link between tank elements in combat
and the higher echelons of command—Rockenbach (commander of the
Tank Corps) and the infantry commanders to which the tank battalions
were attached. While Patton was in the front line, he was not in a
position to receive orders, report, or advise on the feasibility of
new orders. The echelons responsible for strategic decisions were
unable to communicate with Patton who was at the pinnacle of
tactical command during the battle. The means of command and
control were inadequate to respond to events of battle, even at the
slow pace of World War I. The problem of command and control was
not solely a tank problem, but affected the infantry as well.
The Americans repeated the British and French mistake of
allowing infantry and attached tank units to become separated during
the attack. One lesson impressed on American officers was that in
most circumstances the tank could take any objective, but was
ineffectual in holding captured ground. For example, a tank
detachment captured and recaptured Apremont five times before
infantry arrived to consolidate its position. 20 This lesson was
evident to Lt. Colonel Patton and led him to address the topic in a
training pamphlet. "Practical Training, Tank Platoon" (November 10,
1918). He wrote that, "tanks must watch their infantry. If the
latter is held up there is a reason; the tanks must go back and find
out. They must also always watch for helmet and rifle signals from
the infantry. It is perfectly useless for tanks to attack more than
200 MCmetersl ahead of the Infantry. Tanks can take almost anything
but can hold practically nothing. Hence they MUST STAY WITH THE
INFANTRY." 21 Of the conclusions made about the tank during the war,
this one made the strongest impact on American officers.
The concept was constantly stressed in the literature and
tables of organization of the following decades. There was a strong
desire by American officers, theorists, and pundits to wed the tank
to infantry riflemen or vice versa. This trend continued with
experiments in unit composition by the infantry and cavalry,
regardless of the mode of transportation—horses, motorized
infantry, or mechanized infantry.
The third American tank battalion to see action was the 301st.
Trained in England with heavy tanks, this unit had little effect on
doctrine. American heavy tanks were employed in combat exactly as
British units had been. The 301st was attached to the 2nd Tank
Brigade of the British Expeditionary Force (BED, in support of the
2nd American Corps and an Australian Corps during the Meuse-Argonne
Offensive. Because of mechanical breakdowns, and an old British
minefield, less than 30 percent of the brigade's tanks made it into
actual combat. Coordination between infantry and tank units was
extremely poor because the 27th Division, which received the
majority of tank support, had never before conducted operations with
tanks. For these reasons, the 301st Battalion enjoyed only limited
success.
American official heavy tank doctrine changed little during the
war. The War Department simply adopted British tank doctrine for
the U.S. Tank Corps by reprinting documents issued by the British
General Staff in 1917. The short duration of American combat
participation (6 months) did not allow time for doctrine to mature
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or change. The first successful tank operation at Cambrai occurred
only one year before the war ended, and U.S. Tank Corps first
entered combat in September 1918, barely two months before the war
ended. Doctrinal changes take time to gain acceptance by the
majority and there were no technological advances to hasten the
process. Both infantry and tank commanders showed inexperience in
employing the tank because it was a new and not totally proven
weapon. Given the mixed results of tank operations, it is not
surprising that not all were convinced that the tank was a revolu-
tionary weapon. The heavy tank was slow and moved at the infantry's
pace, which complemented its role as an infantry support weapon.
Slow speed, when compared to contemporary tanks, limited employment
options, which in turn stifled alternative thinking. Tactical
doctrine changed more rapidly as the capabilities and limitations
were better understood and tested in combat.
Doctrine governing light tanks varied more than heavy tank
doctrine. The French designed their light tanks as a fast infantry
accompanying tank to operate against German rear areas after their
heavy tanks breached enemy lines. The British employed their medium
tanks (Whippet) along similar principles. Others saw additional
options offered by the FT's speed. Lt. Colonel Patton adopted
cavalry-type tactics to American light tank units and advocated such
operations.
Both heavy and light tanks were most effective when massed for
an attack over suitable terrain. Spacing between tanks on a
divisional front was between 35-100 yards and 200-600 yards
separating attack waves. Tanks were considered to be infantry
support weapons and were placed under control of Infantry Corps or
Divisional commanders. They assisted infantry by crushing down
wire, bringing direct fire on machine guns and trench systems, and
also drawing fire away from attacking infantry. Tanks raised the
morale of attacking troops and demoralized the enemy. The Germans
countered tanks by deploying in depth and developing heavier machine
guns and special rounds for antitank rifles. The deadliest threat
to tanks during the war remained direct fire from artillery pieces.
Smoke was used in support of tanks as an effective countermeasure
against artillery.
With the end of the fighting, evaluation of the role tanks had
played, their future development and organisation, and their
continued existence began to be debated. The effectiveness of tanks
was reduced by a high rate of mechanical unreliability, poor
coordination with infantry, and insufficient techniques for command
and control. Because tanks were developed during wartime, com-
manders needed to establish the proper doctrine to govern them
during combat. Experiences from combat indicated that tanks were
best utilized when assembled in large numbers, organized into
different assault waves, and operating in terrain where they were
free to maneuver. Lt . Colonel Patton critiqued the American Tank
Corps in an after-action report filed November 18, 1918:
1. Infantry officers lacked understanding and apprecia-
tion of tank capabilities, for tanks needed infantry operating
with them at all times to be successful.
2. A lack of liaison between tanks and infantry hampered
efficient operations.
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3. Infantry should act as though tanks were not present
and not expect tanks to overcome resistance and wait expecting
tanks to attempt to consolidate a success.
4. Tanks were too valuable because of their strengths in
firepower and mobility and too weak in mechanical reliability
to be dissipated in reconnaissance missions.
5. The distance between readiness positions and the line
of departure should be reduced, for tanks cannot sustain a
prolonged march without being overhauled and put in order.
6. A thorough preliminary reconnaissance on foot of the
terrain to be used by tanks was absolutely indispensable.
7. The enemy artillery is the dangerous adversary of the
tanks. Therefore, strong supporting artillery ready to deliver
counter-battery fires, as well as screening smoke, was terribly
important to insure tank success.
8. The value of tanks as attacking units and as a
fighting arm had been demonstrated.
9. Some slight changes in tactical employment were
necessary, those looking toward a better utilization of tanks
in mass and in depth. 22
Patton's critique contained many valid observations. With the end
of the fighting, tank enthusiasts would have to test their theories
in the medium of a peacetime army environment.
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Chapter II
REORGANIZATION AND STAGNATION, 1921-1927
The period between the end of World War I and the order to
create an experimental mechanized force in 1927, was influential in
shaping U.S. Armored doctrine, even though tank theory stagnated.
The Tank Corps was abolished in 1920 as a separate arm and all tanks
were placed under Infantry control. The Infantry's dogmatic view
that the tank was only an infantry support weapon helped to thwart
any creative thinking about independent tank action. The role of
the tank as determined by the Infantry not only set the stage for
doctrinal stagnation during the 1920s, but also defined the para-
meters within which armored doctrine was allowed to develop, until
the quick destruction of the Allied Armies by German Panzer
Divisions in May 1940 enlightened the conservative about the full
potential of the tank.
In such a political atmosphere demobilization began, which
brought up the question of how large an Army the United States
needed. This question was ultimately decided in Congress which
controlled the purse strings. In less than a year the U.S. Army
demobilized from a wartime strength of 2,736,654 enlisted men and
officers to the prescribed number. 1 The question of whether the
Tank Corps was to remain a separate service or be placed under the
control of the Infantry needed to be resolved. Because of peacetime
budgetary stringency, this issue was finally decided on economic
grounds rather than on military considerations. Tank design,
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procurement, and training also suffered from inadequate funding.
The end of the war signaled the beginning of analysis to derive
the lessons that would be most applicable to the next war. The Army
also had the new technologies of the tank, air power and electrical
communication to incorporate into the existing structure. The tank
had proved its tactical value by reducing infantry casualties
through crushing down wire and other obstacles, drawing fire away
from the infantry, and destroying enemy machine gun emplacements;
and when present, it increased the morale of friendly troops and
demoralized the enemy. When tanks were used in small numbers their
influence decreased dramatically while the casualty rate among tank
units greatly increased. Colonel Robert Icks, in looking at the
analysis of World War I tank actions, noted the lessons that were
learned and ignored: tanks "... were most effective in depth and
on a narrow front; the holding out of reserves was essential; tanks
and crews could not sustain continuous combat beyond three days;
that combined training and cooperation of all arms including air
were mandatory; a system of communications was needed; smoke was
often a more potent weapon than shell and a continuous system of
supplies, maintenance and salvage was needed to keep up the momentum
of any attack." 2 The value of the tank was not doubted, but the
continuing independence of the Tank Corps did not fit with the
strategic lessons drawn by the Infantry from World War I experience.
The Army's concept of future war became the dominant influence
on tank doctrine because it was the guiding principle of the Army's
planning, which directed its organization and the development/
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adoption of a fighting doctrine. The majority of American officers
seeing combat action served in infantry units, and the brief
involvement with trench warfare helped to foster the false observa-
tion that the infantry played the decisive role. Like other
contemporary military powers, the U.S. Army concluded that the next
war would be dominated by infantry. The Army's concept of future
war envisioned ". . . large infantry armies attacking on parallel
routes, supported by massive artillery, tanks, and air power,
directed by electrical communications, and transported and supplied
by motorized vehicles. . . . " 3 This premise guided senior officers
in establishing organization and doctrine, and in developing new
equipment. The tank's mediocre performance during World War I did
provide evidence, though falsely,* to support the infantry dominated
battlefield concept and to keep tank doctrine relegated to support-
ing infantry. The Army's future war concept served to limit
deviation from official Army thinking and thus to promote stagnation
in tank doctrine.
The adoption of the National Defense Act on June 4, 1920 also
helped to hinder the development of tank theory in America. The
political and economic climate reduced the defense budget to a
minimum, while at the same time the Army was reorganizing and
developing its future war concept of massive infantry armies
supported by tanks, which eventually raised the question whether the
•Faulty employment handicapped the tank's performance more than
its mechanical limitations, thus giving a misleading picture of the
tank's impact.
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Tank Corps should remain independent.
The argument centered on the tank enthusiasts' view of the tank
as a revolutionary weapon and other officers who accepted the tank
as an infantry support weapon within the Army's infantry-dominated
future war concept. General Rockenbach, Colonel Patton, and Major
Sereno E. Brett were the most prominent and vocal supporters. It is
ironic that War Department document No. 865, "Tanks and Their
Employment in Cooperation with Other Arms" (October 1918), declared
that "as the speed of tanks is developed and their machinery
perfected it is possible that their tactical employment may develop
and that their role may become more independent '"* (emphasis mine).
The inclusion of this statement seemed to have been made with the
Whippet or pursuit tank in mind. While not giving total support to
autonomous tank actions, it does take into account operations after
the breach of the German lines. However, soon after the war ended,
pressure began to mount against the tank enthusiasts' view of tanks
conducting any mission other than supporting the infantry. In April
1913 the War Department convened a board of officers to study tank
tactics. The board confirmed the value of tanks in supporting the
infantry, but it condemned the wartime organization of the Tank
Corps as an autonomous unit. The board concluded that tanks were
incapable of independent action and therefore did not need to be an
independent service. Since the tanks' only function would be to
support the infantry, it followed naturally that the Tank Corps
should be placed under the supervision of the Chief of the In-
fantry. 3 This line of thinking was very detrimental to the
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development of U.S. tank doctrine because it closed the door on new
ideas and began a period of stagnation.
U.S. Army doctrine focused on the infantry supported by other
arms. The tank program, if placed under Infantry control, would
lose incentive and motivation for creative and experimental thought
because of the emphasis on (and its role) to support the infantry.
The Infantry would only permit the tank to develop within parameters
that enhanced its abilities to assist the infantry advance.
Supporters of an independent Tank Corps believed that under Infantry
dominance tanks could not develop to their full potential. Colonel
Patton expressed these sentiments in a 1920 article on tanks in
future wars: "As an independent corps, we may assist any one of the
major arms as directed. Absorbed by any one of them, we become the
step-child of that arm and the incompetent assistant of either of
the others."* At the theoretical level, the difference of opinion
centered on how the tank was viewed as a weapon. Some considered it
just an infantry support weapon, others believed it possessed the
potential to perform independent actions.
The Tank Corps was placed under Infantry control and tank
doctrine explored no other roles other than infantry support. Both
Patton and Lt. Colonel Dwight Eisenhower (who commanded the tank
training center at Camp Colt, Pennsylvania during the war) were
reprimanded for advocating tank ideas contrary to official Infantry
doctrine. President Eisenhower later reminisced, "I was told that
my ideas were not only wrong but dangerous, and that henceforth I
would keep them to myself. Particularly I was not to publish
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anything incompatible with solid infantry doctrine. If I did, I
would be hauled before a court-martial." -7 This conservatism within
the Army was responsible for the stagnation of U.S. tank doctrine
and partly explains why America did not produce a Fuller or Liddell
Hart.
The National Defense Act of 1920 assigned all tank units to the
Infantry. The officer corps was divided on the issue and high
ranking officers for both sides testified before Congress. Testify-
ing in favor of the retention of an independent tank service were
Chief of Staff, General Peyton C. March, General Rockenbach, and
Colonel Patton. They advocated continuing the Tank Corps current
functions. These activities included the ". . . dissemination of
information as to tanks, with a view to securing a sound policy as
to their employment and consequent reorganization; fitting for
combat the tanks on hand and producing an improved type from
e.xperience of the World War; developing and improving the training
course through tank schools; and recruiting." - Giving opposing
testimony were General Pershing (Commander AEF) and his aide,
Colonel George C. Marshall. Pershing and Marshall urged that tanks
should remain a supporting arm of the Infantry and denied the need
for a separate tank branch. The final decision became a financial
question for Congress—whether it was financially feasible to
support another separate branch in the Army. Congress decided that
it was not, and the Tank Corps legally became a permanent part of
the Infantry. A separate arm for armor was not established until
1950. Out of this legacy of Infantry control came the term "combat
cars," which is what the Cavalry labeled tanks in the late 1920s and
30s so that they could avoid the legal restraint of the Infantry
controlling all tanks.
The significance of the National Defense Act of 1920 was that
under Infantry dominance the tank became ". . .an appendage to the
infantry and hampered the imaginative use of the tank by reaffirming
it was an infantry weapon, and not a separate arm of the Army." 3
This philosophy carried over and pervaded the General Services
School (later becoming the Command and General Staff School) at Fort
Leavenworth where promising officers destined for high rank were
selected to receive advanced education. Boyd Dastrup, in his
history of the Command and General Staff School, concluded about the
academic atmosphere during the 1920s and 30s that, "although Army
authorities enhanced the stature of the Leavenworth school, they
failed to keep tactics current with technological changes because of
pacifism, neutrality, and conservatism in the United States and in
the Army." 10 Concerning the employment of tanks, the officers were
able to use their positions to enforce orthodoxy: "rather than being
at the front pushing new ways to adopt technology to combat, they
deterred the bold use of the tank and served as counter-productive
agents resisting change." 11 An atmosphere unreceptive to new ideas
served to prohibit experimentation with new tank doctrine in the
twenties and acted as a restraint during the thirties.
The conservatism of Leavenworth instructors was evident in the
way they thought about war. Based on an infantry-dominated bat-
tlefield concept, the instructors thought in terms of the marching
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capabilities of soldiers with nineteenth-century tactics. They
refused to integrate the tank into anything other than a support
role or to create new tactics around the tank. After all, they had
matured in an age before motorization and mechanisation was incor-
porated into the Army. To them "... manpower and not machine
power was the key to victory and [they] stubbornly resisted the use
of the tank as a separate arm." 12 The extreme conservatism at
Leavenworth was especially evident in the restriction that faculty
members base their observations on "established facts" and not on
speculation. 13 Furthermore, in order to ensure uniformity of
tactical doctrine in all schools, the Adjutant General decreed that
any discussion of tank tactics had to begin with the premise that
tactically, tanks served as an auxiliary of the infantry. 1,4 This
curtailed debate about a greater role for tanks with infantry, the
application of cavalry tactics to tanks, and, later, mechanized
warfare. The refusal to contemplate alternative views at the Army
school for higher education helped to create a void in doctrinal
thinking about tanks until the Secretary of War ordered a study of
the British Experimental Mechanized Force in 1927. From that time,
instructors tried to keep the status quo in accordance with official
infantry doctrine. The result was that Britain, Germany, and the
Soviet Union took the lead in mechanized warfare while the United
States, like France, developed a combined arms approach to operate
in an infantry-dominated battlefield.
The Army established the Tank School in 1921. Its respon-
sibility was to teach tank tactics and strategy to officers. A two-
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week course ". . . comprised a study of the strategical and tactical
employment of tanks with other arms, the writing of field orders,
the solution of problems involving movements, both strategical and
tactical, and a night problem employing tanks driven and commanded
by the students themselves" (emphasis mine). 13 Like the General
Service School, the Tank School taught theory and methods that were
compatible with Infantry doctrine. Even the school designated for
training tank officers did not discuss (at least officially) or
teach alternative theories for the employment of tanks. With
pressure to conform to established doctrine and no place to debate
the topic, American tank doctrine became stagnant during the 1920s
and was restricted in the 1930s.
Within this environment some officers had different ideas
towards the employment of tanks. Patton and Eisenhower became close
friends after meeting while at Camp Meade. They both shared the
conviction that research should be accomplished to develop fast
tanks, and that they should attack in mass formations. Along with
Sereno Brett, they believed that the tank was a revolutionary weapon
that could break through and take the enemy from the rear. Their
reasoning was along the same lines as that of Fuller and Liddell
Hart in England. These three men not only differed with the Chief
of Infantry over the employment of tanks, but they also disagreed
with the Commander of the tank service, General Rockenbach. Under
the mounting pressure to conform to established doctrine only Brett
remained in the tank service. In January 1922, Eisenhower trans-
ferred from the Infantry Tank Brigade at Camp Meade to the Infantry
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as Staff Officer to Brigadier General Fox Conner. Patton requested
and received a transfer back to the Cavalry as he saw no future with
the tank service in its then form. Even though both Patton and
Eisenhower were intellectually frustrated in the tank service, they
never lost their enthusiasm for tanks. If they could not bring
change from within the tank service, they hoped their ideas would
meet with a more favorable reception in other branches of the armed
forces.
If what has just been said shows the social and intellectual
milieu and some of the dissenting opinions concerning tanks, what
was accepted American doctrine at this time?
Remembering the Army's future war concept and its emphasis on
an Infantry dominated battlefield and a reliance on combined arms to
defeat the enemy, American tank doctrine evolved in ways that best
fulfilled the desired infantry support role. This trend is evident
in Infantry and tank literature as well as in official documents.
In the United States, France and Britain, early post-World War I
doctrine evolved from the concept of "leading tanks" spearheading
the assault ahead of the infantry and over wide fronts. From this
we see the tank's supporting role and the continued acceptance of
bludgeoning one's way through instead of breaking through at weak
points. 1 * After the war ended, the assessment began of the tank's
performance and potential. Influential upon the implementation of
the recommendations was the views of the head of the Tank Corps
—
General Rockenbach. Brigadier General Rockenbach was a tank
enthusiast, but did not accept the tank as a totally revolutionary
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weapon as did Pattern, Brett, or Eisenhower. While he agreed that
the tank should be used en masse to exploit its great offensive
power, but still acquiesced in the idea that tanks were infantry
support weapons. He once wrote that "the tank was built to restore
the balance between power and mobility that is essential for victory
in war; to crush obstacles and carry gun power into and beyond the
enemy's lines so that an overwhelming number of infantry could reach
the enemy." 17 To classify him would be to call him a tank en-
thusiast whose conservative views sought to maintain the status quo
within the current Army structure.
In the Army's future war concept, the official function of
tanks was "... to make a path through obstacles for the infantry
and protect it from destructive loss from machine guns." 10 Essen-
tially the tank retained the wartime function of increasing fire-
power on critical points, which allowed the infantry to advance and
take their objective. This was reflected in the gunner's first
priority in target acquisition by selecting ". . . the elements
which are most dangerous to their infantry. . . ."•• When accom-
panying infantry, the tank's rate of advance was regulated by the
progress of the infantry. Tankers were urged to press on even if
they were out of ammunition because of the negative psychological
effect on the enemy. 20 Cooperation between infantry and tanks,
which was pitiful during World War I, had to work both ways in the
Army's future war concept. Rockenbach stressed that " infantry
operating with tanks must fight their way forward in all respects,
as though no tanks were present . If this is entirely understood
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tanks will be called on only when strong resistance is encountered;
then they will be on hand and ready, when most needed, to throw
their weight into the attack and push it to success." 21 Fundamen-
tally the tank was to operate on the same principles as heavy tanks
during the war, and hopefully with better command and control, and
cooperation with other arms.
The Army's view of the tank was that it was purely an offensive
weapon to be employed while advancing on the enemy, or defensively
in counter strokes. 22 Instead of making the infantry subservient to
the tank, the Army did the opposite. In mobile warfare, free from
the confines of trench systems, tanks still should ". . .be held in
reserve until trustworthy reconnaissance or actual experience has
shown that the enemy is too strong to be evicted by infantry and
artillery unaided by tanks." 23 While technology had not yet
produced faster tanks, Army officials decided to keep movement with
the soldiers' marching speed and not the speedometer in the future.
They also structured the system to exclude debate and alternative
thinking as technology produced changes.
The Army desired more speed for tanks not to penetrate further
in the enemy's rear areas as in World War II, but to be able to
shift their position from one critical point to another in support
of the Infantry. General Rockenbach agreed with other tank en-
thusiasts about the need for quicker tanks. He believed speed was
essential for the mission detailed above and to improve the tanks'
defenses. 2* A tank's defensive value increased because a moving
target is harder to hit.
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Another opinion on tank employment came from a conference on
the organization and tactics of infantry tanks held by the General
Service School in October and November 1921. Its report helps to
illustrate alternative thinking in the early 1920s. The conferen-
ce's recommendations focused more on how the tank could best support
the infantry, and the cavalry under certain circumstances, rather
than on the best way to utilize the capabilities of the tank.
The conference recommended that one company of light tanks be
assigned to each division, with the remaining tanks forming a GHQ
reserve. Under this scenario each division contained tank units as
organic elements. The tanks in the GHQ reserve would be allotted to
the Corps delivering the main assault. The conference suggested
that by adding more machine guns to tank companies, they could then
be used as machine gun companies in defensive situations. The
report added that tanks might be able to assist horse cavalry in
certain situations. 23 The last two ideas were departures from
accepted doctrine and received unfavorable comments regarding
uniformity of doctrine from the Adjutant General.
The report also received harsh criticism from the Infantry
Board and the Tank Board. Both Boards found fault with the proposed
alterations to tank companies. Major objections included insuffi-
cient numbers of tanks to equip all divisions and GHQ units, and too
much time was required to train tank units for a dual purpose role.
The Tank Board stressed that tanks were offensive weapons only. 2*
The Cavalry also analyzed the conduct of the war for lessons
that were applicable for its branch. It was evident that the horse
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was incapable of forcing a path through wire and obstacles, and
machine guns were extremely devastating. In trench warfare, the
cavalry had to wait for the infantry to create a gap through which
the cavalry could pass. During the war, when German lines were
penetrated the cavalry was too slow in responding; thus, it was
unable to exploit its success.
The cavalry determined that tank was useful in crushing obsta-
cles, in attacking machine gun positions, and drawing fire away from
the cavalry. From wartime tank operations they concluded that under
certain circumstances tanks, especially light tanks, could provide
the support to allow mounted troops to penetrate enemy lines. The
small part played by cavalry units during the war left them looking
for missions to maintain their purpose of being.
Looking at the training regulations used at the Cavalry School
at Fort Riley, Kansas, beginning in 1922, much of early cavalry-tank
doctrine is revealed. The manual, entitled Minor Tactics: Employ-
ment of Cavalry-Training Regulations No. 425-105 . begins by justify-
ing the continued usefulness of the cavalry in modern wartime
conditions. It states that "modern inventions and appliances
affecting the conditions of war have added to the power and scope of
the cavalry. Armed with modern weapons of precision, rifle, machine
rifle, and machine gun, in addition to the saber and pistol, and
supported by mobile artillery and other mobile weapons , cavalry can
adapt itself to any conditions and fit its tactics to any country"
(emphasis mine). 27 The "other mobile weapons" refers to armored
cars and tanks. The cavalry contended that increases in available
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firepower and mobile support units enabled cavalry units to remain
functional in war. This view fitted nicely into the Army's future
war concept.
Others besides Pattern grasped the possibility suggested by the
speed of the Renualt FT and Whippet tanks in accompanying horsed
troops and/or adapting tank tactics to the cavalry. Cavalry
doctrine noted that "since the medium tank can operate on the roads
at a rate of speed exceeding that of cavalry and across ordinary
terrain at a rate approximating the maneuvering gallop, it will be
possible for the tank to accompany cavalry in the performance of its
ordinary functions. . . .
"
2a The cavalry acknowledged that the
value of a tank was offensive power and its ability to provide
supporting firepower to allow the attacker to advance in spite of
the advantage given to the defense by machine guns and obstacles.
The Cavalry concluded that, "tanks are essentially offensive
weapons, acting by shock and short range fire, they have great moral
affect. Due to their weight, mobility, and protective armor, they
are also able to reduce wire and other obstacles which would
seriously delay or check the advance of infantry or cavalry, and
create gaps in those obstacles through which the infantry or cavalry
might advance."2* To the cavalry, the tank's value was its ability
to maintain the rate of the mounted troops' attack in order to
achieve a quick decision.
The cavalry did not believe that tanks would replace the horse
because of its inherent limitations. Besides a perceived poor
cross-country mobility of early models, cavalry officers pointed to
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its ". . . liability to mechanical breakdown and wrecks, difficulty
of maintaining supply of fuel, doubtful ability under many cir-
cumstances to arrive at points off the road, visibility due to
height and dust stirred up, limited observation, difficulty of
marching in columns of other troops, difficulty of outposting
themselves due to limited personnel, difficulty of running at night
without lights, extreme vulnerability to mines and artillery and
difficulty of concealment due to noise. . . .
"
3° With these
limitations and no control over the development of new models, the
cavalry in the early 1920s saw the tank only as providing essential
support so that the horse soldier could perform his traditional role
more efficiently on the modern battlefield.
In 1923, the War Department issued new Army field regulations.
The tank, as portrayed in the regulations, was solely an instrument
for infantry support. Paragraphs 57 and 59 illustrate the in-
fantry's perception of the tank and the role it was to perform. The
regulations state: "the tank constitutes an armored infantry element
possessing protective properties that enable it to close with
entrenched defensive groups protected against the effects of
ordinary infantry fire. Its essential mission is to assist in
breaking down obstacles that check the infantry advance. Tanks find
their most intensive application under conditions that tend to limit
infantry power of maneuver." 31 And in paragraph 59: "the chief role
of the tank is participation in the assault." 32 The tank, as far as
the Infantry was concerned, was to provide the means to allow the
infantry to maneuver by crushing obstacles and adding firepower to
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overcome organized defenses in fortified positions. Regulations
stipulated that, "in preparation for battle, the army commander
reinforce his first-line corps by elements of army troops, par-
ticularly artillery and tanks ..." (emphasis mine). 33 The regula-
tions also directed that "in the initial deployment, a preparation
of the tank strength at the disposition of higher commanders is
usually held in reserve. It may, in whole or in part, be employed
in support of the intervention of the infantry reserve or be sent in
for the support of units already engaged.
"
3* Another example was
the recommendations for attacking fortified positions. Advance
units were first to close with the enemy. Under protection of
advance units, the main body was to use a ". . . final simultaneous
attack along a broad front supported by a powerful artillery and
tanks " (emphasis mine). 33 Gunners were taught that "primary targets
are those (usually machine guns) which are most dangerous to the
riflemen." 3* In teaching, literature and organization, tankers and
infantry commanders were indoctrinated with the concept that tanks
were infantry support weapons, specifically designed to assist the
rifleman's advance.
From wartime experience, artillery was seen as the most deadly
threat to tanks. This resulted in continuing to employ tanks en
masse. As defense against artillery, tanks utilized movement,
concealment or smoke. In general, thicker armor was not determined
to be a solution because of the tank's role in the army. It was to
operate within the range of friendly artillery during the attack,
and as an infantry support weapon, its armor need only be thick
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enough to stop small arms fire and shell splinters. Tanks were to
knock out machine guns, not artillery, thus allowing the infantry to
advance and close with the enemy. With weight in numbers and the
tank's firepower, it was assumed that mobility and maneuverability
could be retained on the battlefield, and the stalemate of World War
I avoided.
The tank arm was centered around the tank company as the basic
combat element. Tank companies were the smallest unit that still
had maintenance and supply functions. There were two types of
companies, each configured slightly differently depending on whether
they were equipped with light or heavy tanks. Light tank companies
had five platoons of five tanks. Heavy tank companies were only
equipped with three platoons; but because it took more men to
operate each tank, they contained more personnel. Battalions were
comprised of three companies of either light or heavy tanks. There
were no composite units of light and heavy tanks. Several bat-
talions combined into groups (later changed to regiments). Both
groups and battalions were equipped with agencies to accomplish all
supply and maintenance functions. All tank units were part of the
General Headquarter 's reserve to be allocated to commanders as the
situation demanded.
The first three years after the signing of the Armistice in
1918 was one of the more influential on the development of opera-
tional doctrine of U.S. Armored Forces. Immediately after the war
ended, strong anti-war sentiment in American society and Congress
coincided with the Army's demobilization and reorganization to
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create the environment in which tank theory was allowed to develop.
The Army returned to its traditional small size and meager peacetime
funding. When the question was raised whether tanks should con-
stitute a separate arm in the army, the answer rested on economic
rather than practical reasoning. At the same time, the Army was
trying to evaluate the lessons from the war and to structure itself
to fight the next war. The army's future war concept envisioned
large infantry armies advancing with the support of artillery,
tanks, and aircraft. Army officers concluded that future bat-
tlefields would be dominated by the infantry and machine guns with
tanks clearing paths through obstacles and providing direct support-
ing fire. In this way tanks would maintain mobility, and therefore
decision on the battlefield. The decisions that tanks were for
supporting infantry and that they should be placed under control of
the Chief of the Infantry ensured that tank doctrine did not
progress along with tank design and technology. This was evident
during the period from 1920 through 1927.
The Army's resistance to doctrinal change, especially among
infantry officers, brought about the stagnation of American tank
theory during the 1920s and served to restrict and hinder develop-
ment in the thirties and early forties. The strict adherence to
infantry principles in the General Service School and Infantry
School restricted alternative thinking about tanks. Threats of
court-martial were even used to repress new ideas. Given these
attitudes and policies, American tank theory stopped developing
under Infantry control. While the Infantry exerted pressure
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throughout the late 20s and 30s to keep tank under its exclusive
control, it was becoming evident that new more reliable and faster
tanks, and new theories abroad deserved analysis.
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Chapter III
A PERIOD OF DIVERGENT EXPERIMENTATION, 1927-1931
Between 1928 and 1933 the Army began openly to discuss motor-
ization and mechanization and their effect on the future. Advances
in reliability and speed had changed the character of the tank. To
some officers, the tank was becoming more capable of an independent
role than it had been in the past. As Army leaders pondered the
future effects and course of mechanization/motorization within the
Army, the British organized an experimental force to test their
theories of the new warfare. British mechanized maneuvers on the
Salisbury Plain in 1927 provided the impetus for the Americans to
organize their own experimental mechanized force in 1928. Before
examining the American experiment, we should first review new
opinions about tanks that developing prototypes produced.
The end of the World War I found the Ordnance Department
without any long-range plans for tanks during the 1920s. Infantry
control over all tank units removed the impetus for other arms to
show interest in tank design; and until the Tank Board was es-
tablished in 1924, no direct channels existed for communication
between tank units and Ordnance officials pertaining to the develop-
ment of experimental models. The Infantry placed emphasis on light,
fast tanks because they were cheaper to build, did not exceed the
Corps of Engineers bridge weight limits, and there was a growing
belief that light, fast tanks had greater tactical value over the
slower heavy tanks. Without guidance from an appointed body, tank
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design in the United States almost completely came to a standstill.
The War Department approved the construction of light tank designs
in 1922, but no action was taken until 1926. Thus, the Army had to
rely on obsolete material for training and experiments. The lack of
new designs helped to limit the development of tank theory to the
capabilities of the modified FT and MK. VIII tank. In a continuous
circle, a lack of theoretical growth can be attributed to an absence
of new tank designs, and the need for better tank designs was
restricted by the stagnation of theoretical development.
Infantry specifications were for a postwar light tank weighing
not more than five tons. This weight limit ensured that they were
transportable by truck. Other requirements were sufficient armor
protection against heavy machine guns, a twelve m.p.h. speed, and a
cruising radius of fifty miles. In 1926, the maximum weight and
speed were raised to six tons and twenty m.p.h. The first ex-
perimental light tank was not constructed until 1927. The Tl-El was
armed with machine guns, weighed seven and a half tons, and was
capable of eighteen m.p.h. The Tl-El's speed made it acceptable as
either a leading or an accompanying tank.
Tank development funds were also allocated to developing a
medium tank in hope of combining the most desirable characteristics
from the heavy and light tank. The medium tank program, as designed
by the Adjutant General's office and Ordnance Department, was at
first limited to a fifteen ton weight limit. Building the tank with
one-inch armor, to stop armor-piercing .50 cal. bullets, eventually
proved impossible to construct without exceeding fifteen tons. In
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1926, the weight limit for medium tanks was raised to twenty tons,
but funding was also allocated for research for a fifteen ton model.
Several models in both weight classes were tested, but none were
standardized. And while none were accepted, their test results were
beginning to stimulate some discussion of future tank tactics. For
instance, J. Walter Christie, an American automotive engineer,
designed, built, and submitted a number of different tanks, but all
were rejected for various reasons. Yet, features like large
engines, independent suspension systems, and removable tracks
allowed his tanks to achieve cross-country speeds up to forty m.p.h.
By removing the tracks, the tank could run on rubber wheels and
reach seventy m.p.h. on roads. Compared to the war surplus tanks
then equipping tank units, Christie's twenty-three ton tank gave a
remarkable performance. While Mr. Christie had to look to other
countries for orders of his design, his tanks demonstrated the
possibility of armor breaking away from the infantry and close
support missions. Technology was advancing to the point where it
was feasible to contemplate tank thrusts as Patton, Fuller, and
Liddell Hart envisioned.
While tank designs slowly progressed, the real spark to
American armored development occurred on Salisbury Plain in England.
As noted in the previous chapter, internal and external constraints
had hindered the development of armored warfare in the U.S. Army.
In Britain, conditions existed in which tank theory could develop,
complemented by the intellectual prodding of Major General J.F.C.
Fuller and B.H. Liddell Hart (a historian and a military
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correspondent for The Daily Telegraph ). They championed the idea of
a new army based on the tank and mechanization. Their revolutionary
concept put the tank as the key element, with armored personal
transporting infantry and tracked vehicles to move the artillery.
However, Britain fitted the tank into the existing conventional
structure. Tanks were designed to assist the infantry: slow, heavy
classics armed with machine guns and howitzers. Cavalry models were
fast with mounted machine guns. British armored formations relied
heavily on tanks operating on their own, like warships. This
organization represented an advance in mobility over infantry or
cavalry divisions, ". . . but their unbalanced composition confined
them to the limited role of exploiting success won in battle by
other formations, which horse cavalry had previously performed." 1
The British Experimental Mechanized Force contained: the 3rd
Bn. Royal Tank Corps (armored cars and tankettes); the 5th Bn. Royal
Tank Corps (Mark II tanks); the 2nd Bn. The Somerset Light Infantry
(a machine gun battalion carried in half tracks and six-wheeled
armored cars); the 9th Field Brigade, Royal Artillery (towed by
tracked vehicles or half tracks, except one battery which was self-
propelled); the 3th Light Battery, Royal Artillery (carried in half
tracks); and the 17th Field Company, Royal Engineers (carried in
vehicles). 2 Also supporting the Mechanized Force was Nos, 16 Army
Co-operation Squadron, No. 3 (Fighter) Squadron, and No. 7 and 11
(Bomber) Squadrons. The British included infantry, artillery, and
engineering units to assist the tanks advance and perform functions
that tanks were incapable of. All vehicles were tracked or all-
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wheel drive to facilitate cross-country movement. Many nations
watched the British experiment, and the mobility and striking power
were noted. Witnessing the British demonstration as part of the
American delegation was Secretary of War Dwight Davis. He was
sufficiently impressed to order the creation of a similar force in
the United States to serve as an experimental laboratory.
The object of this experiment was to determine the proper
development of equipment and the correct doctrine for mechanizing
any future units. The unit was to be self-sufficient and include
troops from all branches. Secretary Davis made it truly a test in
research by giving the future commanding officer the authority to
ignore existing regulations concerning organization, armament, and
equipment. 3
The actions of Secretary Davis also partly removed the
restraints on armored theory that was unofficially imposed during
the early 1920s. Previous articles on tanks or tank design always
conformed to Army official doctrine. Now authors could write
theoretical articles and envision the future and mechanization.
There was no mass defection from the current doctrine, nor a
watershed of articles, but writings on tank theory/mechanization did
appear more often.
The demonstration of the British experimental force and the
improved performance of the American tank model not only affected
Infantry perceptions, but they also were noted by the Cavalry.
Major General Herbert 0. Crosby, Chief of the Cavalry, recommended
the incorporation of tank units and anti-tank guns into cavalry
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formations. The Cavalry became interested in light tank development
because of the greater speed the new tank possessed. Just as Georqe
Patton had argued ten years earlier, the Cavalry was beginning to
see that fast tanks embodied the same principles of action and
strategy that the cavalry had performed for centuries. While the
Cavalry did not intend to replace the horse with the tank, tanks did
possess the one quality that prevented the Cavalry from functioning
in the World War I
—
invulnerability to machine gun fire. Operating
on traditional cavalry principles, the inclusion of a few tank units
would increase the value of the Cavalry Arm in the next war. Some
officers, including those in high ranks, saw the tank as a helpful
component in preserving the traditional mission of the cavalry.
First Lieutenant Eugene T. Smith, a member of the Tank Board,
expressed favorable arguments for integrating tanks and armored cars
into cavalry formations. In an article appearing in the January
1928 issue of The Cavalry Journal , he argued that, "the use of
armored vehicles with advance guards, because of their invul-
nerability to machine gun and rifle fire, will be a great advantage,
not only because they inspire confidence in the troops they are
accompanying, but also because of the morale effect upon the hostile
force."'4 To justify the tanks' importance in a breakthrough, he
wrote, "To destroy any temporary centers of resistance or isolated
machine gun nests, the armored vehicle can be of untold value to the
cavalry in such an exploration. It can be used to push ahead and
move rapidly to the rear of the troops on either side of the
breakthrough, causing greater demoralization by reason of its
presence." 3 In addition to breakthrough missions, Smith thought
tanks were suitable for reconnaissance and counterreconnaissance,
security of other forces, delaying actions, holding terrain of
tactical importance until friendly forces arrived, pursuit, covering
withdrawals, and raiding. Lieutenant Smith voiced a growing opinion
that tanks enhanced the power of the Cavalry and should be in-
tegrated into the existing system. General Crosby recommended that
a small detachment of tanks be assigned to the Cavalry for evalua-
tion as the basis for future development. He received encouragement
from Secretary Davis who supported experiments in mechanization.
Meanwhile, the Army proceeded with its own version of a mechanized
force.
On December 30, 1927, General Charles P. Summerall, Chief of
Staff, approved the G-3 report for the organization of the Ex-
perimental Mechanized Force. The backbone of the force was tanks.
The Experimental Mechanized Force was composed of the 16th tank
battalion (heavy), the 17th tank battalion (light), plus one
separate tank platoon (light), one battalion of the 34th Infantry
Regiment (motorized), one armored car troop, 2nd battalion of the
6th Field Artillery (carried in trucks
—
portee), one engineer
company, a signal company, one medical detachment, the 1st Ammuni-
tion train, a chemical warfare platoon, an ordnance maintenance
platoon, and a provisional motor repair section.* The American
formation used tanks as the main fighting elements to which support-
ing elements were attached. However, unlike the British, auxiliary
units (the medical detachment and motor repair section) were also
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included to make the Mechanized Force self-contained. The War
Department directive organizing the Experimental Mechanized Force
stated its objective as to ascertain "by practical tests in tactical
and strategic employments, . . . its organization and equipment with
a view to developing correct doctrines with respect to motorization
and mechanization of appropriate units of the Army." 7 Like the
British experiment the previous summer, the American experiment
explored the nature and practicability of entirely mechanized
armi es.
The Experimental Mechanized Force assembled the first week in
July, 1923 at Fort George C. Mead, Maryland. Command was given to
Colonel Oliver Eskridge, an infantry tank officer and former
Commandant of the Tank School The first week was spent giving
instruction on equipment and determining proper methods and proce-
dures for road travel. The next week, a march to Aberdeen Proving
Grounds, Carlisle Barracks, and return to Meade provided practical
experience on marching columns and the data to test theories and
formations. For the remainder of July, the Force received instruc-
tion and training for tactical operations. The experiment was
terminated after completing field maneuvers to test previous
training and the new methods developed during the summer exercises.
On September 19, 1928 General Parker recommended that the Experimen-
tal Force, having completed its mission, be disbanded. After
October 1 the different units began returning to their home sta-
tions.
The significance of the Experimental Mechanized Force was that
it provided the Army with valuable practical experience with an all-
mechanized force to help decide the future of mechanization for the
U.S. Army. Information was gathered on proper march formations,
rate of march, night marches, supply, command, and unit composition.
It also facilitated the testing of different theories, and further
revealed the great mobility and potential shock and power. Limiting
factors included insufficient equipment, improper balance and
uniqueness of the formation, and the obsolescence of wartime
equipment. The performance of the outdated tanks was the greatest
obstacle to overcome. Still, both Colonel Eskridge and Brig.
General Parker believed that the Force furnished pertinent technical
and tactical information.
The Experimental Mechanized Force was a "real life" exploration
of mechanized theory that the Army conducted while contemplating the
effect of motorized and tracked vehicles on the Army's future
development and organization. Most officers acknowledged the
obsolescence of American tanks and that current experimental models
in the testing stages were going to promote some changes. The
questions being debated among officers were: did the development of
faster and more reliable tanks affect their employment in combat,
which parts of the Army were affected, and what, if any, restructur-
ing of organization or doctrine were necessary? More simply, was
the Army's concept of using tanks in combat still current, or had
tank capabilities changed enough to mandate a different function;
and if so, what was the correct role of tanks and mechanization for
the Army?
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In 1928, the Army began its long-range mechanization planning.
Projected mechanization was centered on the report submitted by
General Parker, assistant chief of staff G-3. He recommended the
procurement of light and medium tanks, a reconnaissance car, cross-
country vehicles for infantry and supporting units, and self-
propelled artillery for mechanized units; and that funding start
during the 1930 fiscal year. Second, a permanent mechanized unit
should be established during fiscal year 1931, and during 1931 and
1932 obsolete equipment should be phased out and replaced. The
report was approved by Secretary Davis in April; and a board of
General Staff officers was organized to oversee future action.
General Parker's report also studied firepower and mobility as
keys to gaining success in modern warfare. To Parker the tank was
the means of restoring decision to the battlefield. Parker deviated
from standard Army doctrine concerning tank employment. He argued
that, contrary to Infantry doctrine, tanks should not be tied to the
advance of the foot soldier; instead tanks should penetrate,
attacking enemy reserves and rear areas. Parker's report envisioned
"light tanks, the leading element in an assault, attacked weak
points in the defense; enemy flanks were particularly vulnerable.
Self-propelled artillery and medium tanks supported the advance by
overcoming strong points and widening gaps in the enemy's Infantry,
brought forward in mechanized vehicles, consolidated the ground
captured by the tanks. All supply, maintenance, and other support
elements needed mechanized transportation in order to keep up with
the advance.'"* Parker's report would find favor with the growing
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number of pro-mechanization officers.
The Mechanization Board first met on May 15, 1928 and was
comprised of eleven officers. It was hoped that inclusion of
representatives from each branch would prevent any branch rivalries
from surfacing. In general, the Board functioned well in performing
its stated duties and branch rivalries did not surface on this
level. The Board was present for the demonstrations of new tank
models and witnessed the maneuvers of the Experimental Mechanized
Force during the summer of 1928. In October 1928, the Board
published its own report on the mechanized experiment. Its report
echoed the same conclusions that General Parker reached in his
report. The Board foresaw future mechanized force centered on the
tank for both striking power and mobility. Against Infantry
doctrine, it also put infantry transported by mechanized vehicles in
close support of the tanks. The unit was to be self-supporting with
the addition of self-propelled artillery, and supply and maintenance
units equipped with cross-country vehicles. The Board also recom-
mended the establishment of another experimental mechanized force to
continue tactical and technical testing.
All branch chiefs agreed with the Mechanization Board's report
except the Chief of Infantry, General Stephen 0. Fuqua. Fuqua's
dissenting opinion contained some valid points. But his underlying
concern was for independent tank units and the fear of the Infantry
losing control over tanks. General Fuqua based his arguments on
maintaining the status quo and tradition. In his mind, and he was
not alone, the future of the tank could best be developed by the
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Infantry. Tanks originally were developed to aid the advance of the
Infantry. On tactical grounds he was correct in pointing out that
"tanks with infantry divisions increased the mobility of the
rifleman and brought firepower down to the level of the foot sol-
dier." 10 He also expressed concerns about new weapons and doctrine
being forced on other branches over the objection of branch chiefs.
Looking to the past General Fuqua was unwilling, or unable, to peer
into the future to see the full potential of the tank. In his
defense, theories of mechanisation like Patton's, Fuller's, or
Liddell Hart's were only theories. Their validity was not confirmed
until the German drive through France to the English Channel in May
1340.
The difference of opinion between the Mechanized Board and the
Chief of the Infantry was the beginning of a long-running argument
that continued throughout the 1930s—who was best qualified to
develop tank doctrine, and what was the correct doctrine? Like the
argument over the future of the Tank Corps a decade earlier, branch
rivalries played a large role just what the Mechanized Board wanted
to avoid. A split developed over the direction and control of tank
theory: one faction led by the Infantry to retain control; and
another, exploring the use of independent mechanized forces.
General Fuqua vehemently opposed the creation of a new separate
branch and worked to keep all tanks under Infantry control as stated
by law. Despite Fuqua's objections, the War Department proceeded
with mechanization plans.
The Infantry clung to the same doctrine used during the World
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War I. In combat, it still wanted to employ two types of tanks,
each with a different role. The increased speed of tanks increased
their strategic and tactical mobility and not their mission accord-
ing to Infantry thinking. Tanks were support weapons for the
infantry, who continued to advocate frontal assaults with combined
arms to overcome the opposition.
Just how far tank doctrine had progressed under Infantry
control can be found from a four part article entitled "Our Tanks,"
which appeared in the Infantry Journal in 1929 and 1930. Written by
Major Ralph E. Jones, a tactical instructor at the Tank School, the
articles covered American tank units from equipment and organization
to school training and the Tank Board. Jones made distinctions
between tanks (leading/accompanying) and tank formations (Armored
Force/Mechanized Force). His articles are more informative than the
contemporary Field Manuals.
Based on tactical roles, the Infantry made a distinction
between tanks as either "leading tanks" or "accompanying tanks." In
combat, " leading tanks smash the way for the main effort of the
attack by the line troops. They attack as a single unit to facili-
tate and insure the capture of certain important objectives. They
precede the foot troops by a greater distance than do accompanying
tanks and they are independent of the lesser infantry unit com-
manders. They penetrate deeply into the enemy's organization and do
not delay their advance for the purpose of keeping near the assault-
ing foot troops." 11 In effect, heavy tanks made pathways for the
infantry to advance. It was mandatory that leading tanks attack in
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depth, deployed in waves. Accompanying tanks worked in close
cooperation with front-line soldiers. As part of the main axis of
attack, the role of accompanying tanks was to neutralize such points
of resistance as might develop after the leading tanks had passed. 12
The sole mission of tanks to supply firepower to assist the soldiers
advance was clearly evident.
The basic tank unit was the tank company, and rarely did the
Infantry theorize about larger, tactical or strategic units.
However, some thought was given to mechanized and armored forces as
tank performance improved, and as the Army considered mechanization.
Major Jones also defined the Infantry's concept of mechanized and
armored forces. A mechanized force is a composite of armored
elements (which do not dismount to fight) and motorized elements
(which do dismount to fight). 13 Because the infantry was not
mechanized it possessed only limited cross-country ability. A
mechanized force, as envisioned, only enabled the soldiers to keep
up with the tanks. The unit still conformed to the infantry-
dominated future war concept of the Army. Armored vehicles com-
prised practically all of an armored force. Differing from a
mechanized force, an armored force was intended for relatively
independent combat missions, such as exploiting a break-
through. **
Although the Infantry did study tank theory, it always confined
tanks to the role of firepower in support of the infantry and at the
pace of marching men. For instance, to achieve a breakthrough with
tanks the attack would consist of: ". . . first, the leading tanks;
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then the accompanying tanks (with the foot troops); and finally, the
armored force, whose mission is to overrun the enemy's rear areas
and thus exploit the success and prevent the enemy from restoring
his defensive system." 13 The Infantry did not accept Fuller's, or
Liddell Hart's, concept of the tank as a revolutionary weapon, but
continued to think in terms of static warfare conducted in France
during World War I. When encountering enemy troops in prepared
positions, ". . . infantry tanks assisted the foot soldiers in a
frontal assault. The infantry gave no thought to bypassing these
positions and isolating them from their command and supply facili-
ties." 16 The sending of an armored force into the enemy rear areas
is deceiving. The basic tank unit was a company allotted to
infantry battalions in platoon strength for support. An armored
force was being thought of in terms of battalion strength, not divi-
sions, corps or armies. American commanders lacked any experience
handling large-scale units before the war.
After the Army authorized a new mechanization policy, General
Fuqua once again protested against other branches being assigned
tanks. In a critical memo to the Chief of Staff that ". . . tanks
were infantry weapons and fighting with infantry was their habitual
role; this arrangement should remain unchanged." 17. Because of
Fuqua' s position he could exert much power and influence to restrict
the development of the tank in his branch. The new Infantry Field
Manual issued in 1931, still assigned tanks to provide supporting
fire to aid the advance of the infantry. It gave more detail to
tank doctrine than the few sentences contained in the 1923 Field
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Service Regulations . Still, the Infantry remained in the same mind
set as before.
British military intellectual, Major General J.F.C. Fuller,
observed in lectures on mechanization that: "the advantage of
motorization and mechanization are that they reduce space by
economizing time. In other words, the more rapidly we move the
smaller becomes the bulk of the area we are called upon to defend.
Strategically, time and space are relative, and as the history of
war has shown again and again, a handful of men at a certain spot at
a certain hour is frequently a far more powerful instrument of war
than ten times the number on the same spot twenty- four hours
later." 10 The Infantry earlier had grasped the strategic principle,
but had not carried the concept as far as Fuller and others. To the
infantry, the tank ". . . was essentially a machine gun carrier,
only armed with sufficient protection to ward off enemy machine gun
fire." 1 "9 With new technology in the early thirties, the Army began
to lean more towards light and medium tanks. Medium tanks were seen
as a compromise to incorporate the best features of the heavy and
light tank into one chassis. One innovation that has not been
mentioned that affected tank design as well as doctrine was the
perfection of reliable treads. New designs increased tread life and
speed to an extent that transporting tanks by carriers was not
necessary. This marked the ability of tanks to accomplish long
movements under their own power. These developments did not change
the role of the tank, but they did enlarge the scope of missions
tanks were allowed to perform.
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The Infantry did incorporate the faster tank speeds into
doctrine. The greater tank speed gave the commander the option of
holding his tank units from the initial attack until resistance
stopped the foot troops, then "... push the tanks forward
promptly, directing them to neutralize the hostile fire and help the
assault units resume the advance." 20 Speed also became a way of
reducing casualties. The rationale was that fast tanks required
less time to reach enemy resistance, and to search for and destroy
hostile machine guns and other weapons. Decreasing the time
necessary in gaining fire superiority would therefore permit the
assaulting foot troops to advance more rapidly and with fewer
casualties. The function of tanks had not changed in infantry
doctrine, but the infantry officers acknowledged a different
time/space ratio.
The Infantry Board and some officers questioned the effects of
greater tank speed and the fear of infantry becoming separated from
the tanks as happened in World War I. Solutions for preventing the
separation of tanks and infantry were better training in
tank/infantry cooperation, assigning tanks limited objectives (where
tanks would wait till the soldiers caught up). If the tanks
neutralized all local resistance they were to seek shelter in the
nearest defilade, or concealment, until the foot troops reach the
objective. 21 These last two solutions clearly illustrate the
continued policy of separating tanks from the infantry, and the
leading role of the Infantry while making tanks supporting weapons.
Seeing the vulnerability of tanks to antitank guns and direct firing
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artillery, infantry was taught to protect the tanks from the danger.
Infantry support in tank actions consisted of locating hostile
antitank weapons and informing tank crews of their locations, and
destroying those weapons when it was within their power to do so.
The Infantry in the early 1930s also was more receptive towards
a limited, independent fast tank exploitation. This exploitation
could only take place after infantry and tanks breached the enemy
lines. Using "... a regiment of fast tanks properly organized and
equipped might be thrown into the fight to seize the essential
feature of terrain, disrupt artillery that still interferes with the
advance, and harass the defender's communications. One of the most
important missions of fast tanks thus employed would be to disor-
ganize and scatter the hostile organized reserves in order to
prevent counterattacks or the organization of hostile defense n a
new position farther to the rear." 22 Essentially, Fuller's and
Liddell Hart's theory was adapted to U.S. Infantry doctrine applied
at the infantry's rate of advance. Throughout this period and the
late thirties, Infantry doctrine incorporated new technology and
acceptable tank doctrine into its own fixed parameters, and tank
theory (under infantry control) could not, and did not develop
further
.
The further development of tank theory in the United States
rested with the Cavalry, which began to see the tank as a modern
extension of cavalry strategy and tactics. Pro-mechanization
officers found a more receptive audience in the Cavalry than in the
other branches. Advances were the result of the work of many
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officers in all branches. It was an uphill struggle that made
progress only by constant prodding. The young junior officers who
were impressed by the tank during the war gradually gained seniority
and held influential positions to advocate their beliefs. It was
never the case of the Cavalry abandoning the horse in favor of the
tank and other mechanized units. But the course of events placed
the least restraints on mechanization within the Cavalry.
Prior to 1931, when General Douglas MacArthur, the new Chief-
of-Staff, set a new mechanization policy for the Army, the explora-
tion into tank theory was governed by the Mechanization Board.
Differing from standard infantry doctrine, the Mechanization Board's
approach relied on the tank, supported by infantry units, as the
basic combat component. Using the proposed Mechanized Force as a
tactical and technical laboratory, the proper composition, equipment
and extent of application to the U.S. Army would be determined.
Mechanized development guided by the Mechanization Board was
hampered by the further reduction of already small peacetime Army
budgets owing to the financial crisis of the Depression, the lack of
a suitable tank to standardize, and the conservatism within the
Army. Branch rivalries sometimes surfaced because the Infantry was
afraid of losing control of the tanks and the Cavalry feared being
replaced by tanks. With such open reservations being expressed, new
tank theory was only slowly formalized. It was the general opinion
within all branches that the new mechanized theory should be
perfected and proven at the tactical level before any full commit-
ment be authorized. So, with obsolete wartime surplus tanks the
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Mechanized Board began to oversee mechanized experiments formed
around a combined arms organization that was acceptable to the
Army's future war concept that emphasized infantry penetration and
cavalry exploitation. 23
The first significant report on mechanization and its impact on
future Army planning was submitted by General Parker in March 1928.
As noted earlier, the major points were that: the tank was the basic
element with supporting infantry; all components were mechanized to
keep pace with the advance of the tanks; the creation of tactical
laboratories to test theory and equipment; and the establishment of
a board of officers to oversee Army mechanization planning. While
the report's recommendations were approved, the establishment of a
permanent mechanized force was postponed from 1930 to 1931 because
of a lack of available funds. The recommendations were followed
until Army mechanization policy changed in 1931.
Only one other report during this period drew considerable
attention. The report was submitted to the Adjutant General by
Colonel James K. Parsons on April 17, 1930. Colonel Parsons, as the
field commander of the Mechanized Force, was instructed to report on
his findings. An experienced tanker, the current Commandant of the
Tank School and Commanding Officer of Fort Meade, his report is
interesting because of its radical proposals for mechanization: the
reactions to it illustrate differences of opinions at this time.
Parsons's report was too radical at the time, but during World War
II, the rapid expansion of U.S. armored divisions followed lines
similar to those outlined in his report.
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Colonel Parsons' plan called for the funding and organization
of six armored divisions. Akin to Fuller's idea, the division was
composed of only tanks in the combat element. Based on Christie-
type tanks, three versions were needed: combat (medium), reconnais-
sance (light fast tanks), and command (mediums without a main gun).
Command and control was accomplished through radios, visual means
(flags or smoke), and aircraft. Attached air units provided
additional reconnaissance and support. The proposed armored
divisions would be self-contained and capable of extended opera-
tions. Parsons believed that assault missions (infantry type) were
wasteful of the unit's superior mobility. The unit was better
suited for covering the advance or retirement of an army, attacking
the enemy's flank or rear, exploiting a breakthrough, seizing
strategic positions, and filling a gap in the line. 2 "4 The tank
platoon was the basic combat unit and attacked in lines. The
division was composed of 486 combat tanks, 172 reconnaissance tanks,
and 87 command tanks. Parsons estimated the formation of all six
divisions would be approximately 270 million dollars.
The general reaction is exemplified by Lieut. Colonel Ralph
Talbot, Jr. in a memorandum for General Booth on Parsons' s report,
"to attempt to set up such a program as is recommended in this paper
is believed, at this time, to be premature. Such elaborate scheme
will frighten the timid, shock the conservative, and antagonize the
reactionary." 20 Parsons was criticized because he was basing the
divisions on a tank that was still undergoing testing and develop-
ment, and the overall balance of personnel. Besides questioning
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technical aspects, he voiced concerns about spending a large sum on
an organization that was limited by geography. Many of the points
raised by critics were valid, and the course of later events
revealed that Parsons' ideas were too progressive for the times.
Many officers wanted mechanization to proceed, but there was a large
difference of opinion as to which was the proper employment and
composition. Overall opinion within the Army supported developing
mechanization in small, gradual increments after the correct ideas
crystallized from experience. Longtime mechanization and tank
advocate George S. Patton, Jr. expressed major reservations about
Parsons's report, illustrating the hesitancy for drastic and quick
change in the mechanization program. He wrote "the organization of
one or more tank divisions at the present time and based on present
data is unwise," and "the creation of a small mechanized force, such
as is now in progress of creation by the War Department gives the
best promise of success for a unit composed of combined arms." 2*
Patton' s conception was analogous to the cuirassier divisions of
Napoleon. Major Patton concluded that "past and present information
of tanks induces the belief that any independent tank force must be
utilized . . . as an offensive reserve for the delivery of a rapid
and powerful blow over a limited front at a carefully selected
time."27 This idea is a strictly traditional cavalry conception
with modern weapons applied.
The uncertainty of proper doctrine and performance of mecha-
nized units, the divergence of opinion among officers, and the lack
of funding for such an ambitious program that was proposed all
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combined to influence the War Department against Parsons' s recommen-
dations. Colonel Parsons' s study was probably the most radical
proposal of this period, and it stimulated a great deal of thinking,
which is recorded in the literature and official correspondence.
In 1930 General Summerall ordered the organization of a
permanent mechanized force to conduct practical experiments in
search of proper doctrine governing such forces. General Summerall
interestingly appointed Colonel Daniel Van Voorhis as commanding
officer. Colonel Van Voorhis was a cavalry officer with no prior
experience with tanks. Yet from statements in articles and annual
reports, Summerall clearly grasped the correlation between the
superior mobility that mechanized force possessed and cavalry
tactics. Summerall also selected Major Sereno Brett as executive
officer to Van Voorhis. Major Brett was an experienced tanker and a
longtime tank advocate. An instructor at the Tank School, he had
commanded the 304th Tank Brigade during World War I. The formation
was to assemble by October 30, 1931 at Fort Eustis, Virginia.
During combat exercises, the Mechanized Force was to execute
missions presenting an opportunity for tactical and strategic
mobility and a quick, hard striking power. Proper tactics necessary
to operate fast tanks in conjunction with other mechanized or
motorized arms were to be determined and modified by the commanding
officer . 2B
Colonel Van Voorhis faced many obstacles in training the
Mechanized Force. A lack of adequate funding and operating with
obsolete equipment were sources of constant concern. The failure of
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the Ordnance Department to produce a suitable tank for the Tank
Board was the greatest handicap. As Timothy Nenninger correctly
pointed out in his thesis on the development of American Armor,
however, tanks were the nucleus of the force "everything else might
disappear and tanks still could accomplish at least part of the
mission; but without tanks the remainder of the force was use-
less." 2,0 Still, Van Voorhis lobbied for improvements and did the
most with what he was given. Even though the Mechanized Force was
disbanded after one year (due to a change in Army mechanization
policy), it did accomplish further experimentation and provided
American officers with a field laboratory and data which the Army
felt was necessary to attain before making a major commitment in
mechanization
.
The current conception of a mechanized force focused on high
mobility and striking power of the tank. Yet the tank was not a
perfect weapon and possessed certain limitations that required the
support of auxiliary units. Factors such as a weak defensive power
and direct fire capacity of the main gun (or machine guns) helped to
set certain parameters for the composition of the force. Pro-
mechanization advocates concluded:
Since the tanks have little holding power, such a force
must include a highly mobile infantry to hold the ground gained
by the tanks. As the infantry must be given great defensive
power, its armament will consist for the most part of automatic
weapons. In view of the distance from principle forces at
which the mechanized force will operate, it will require the
support of artillery immediately at hand and must therefore
include in its composition an artillery element having a
mobility equal to that of the tanks. It must be self contained
in other respects and receive the necessary quota of chemical
warfare weapons, antiaircraft, engineers, signal corps, and
71
transport, all adapted to movement conforming to the tanks and
especially equipped for the accomplishment of this particular
mission. Its action would be supported by the aviation of the
field army to which the mechanised force would normally be
attached. The requirements of mobility leads to the adoption
of the tank chassis for a large part of the gun mounts and
cross-country transport of all elements of the force. 30
Based on these assumptions, the Mechanized Force was structured to
emphasize mobility.
The Mechanized Force assembled at Fort Eustis contained thirty-
six officers, 648 men, and 167 vehicles organized on a regimental
level. The tank nucleus was a tank company of twenty-two tanks—two
radio and command tanks (one T1E2 and one M1917 modified), three
T1E2, six M1917 tanks modified with Franklin engines, and eleven
M1917s. 31 Other vehicles were twenty passenger cars, eleven armored
cars (a reconnaissance company), fifteen motorcycles, seven cater-
pillar tractors, thirty-three carrier cart trucks, two generator
trucks, four kitchen trucks, four radio trucks, five trailers, three
antiaircraft machine gun trucks, fifteen tank carriers, one machine
shop truck, one wrecking truck, one caterpillar wire layer, eleven
six-wheeled machine gun trucks and eleven class B trucks to carry a
company of motorized infantry. 32 It is evident that the Armored
Force, as configured, was not self-contained like the Experimental
Mechanized Force. The Armored Force lacked artillery units which
decreased its fire power. The number of tracked vehicles was
reduced, which affected the mobility on broken terrain. Utilizing
truck (wheeled) transports enabled greater strategic mobility on
roads, but was at the expense of tactical mobility on open terrain.
The Armored Force used its road speed to arrive at a point and
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relied en the fire power and shock value of the tanks to achieve
decisive results on the battlefield. Speed was also essential for
conducting pursuit or exploitation missions. Van Voorhis' training
program began on November 1, 1930 and lasted until June 31, 1931,
when the unit was disbanded.
Because the Mechanized Force was to study the use of fast tanks
with other mechanized and/or motorized arms, training focused on
operations against entrenched infantry or other mechanized forces.
Exercises involved night, tactical and strategic marches, and
attacks against entrenched infantry or other mechanized forces. The
attacks employed wide turning movements, seizing crucial terrain
features, exploiting breakthroughs, counterattacks and missions as
covering force, flank or rear guards. (Notice the similarities to
the traditional cavalry missions!) Training was accomplished
through command post exercises, field problems, and maneuvers.
Command and control problems associated with highly mobile
independent units remained unsolved until it became practical to
install a radio in each tank. Control at this point was ac-
complished by the platoon commander receiving orders by radio and
then communicating to his platoon by voice (when able), signal
flags, or flares. Tanks usually deployed in ". . . two platoons of
three fighting tanks each in the front line, and one platoon of
three fighting tanks and the radio or tank commander's tank in
reserve. Each platoon normally attacks in line with intervals of
100 yards between tanks, which gives a front of 500 or 600 yards.
With each platoon is one self-propelled 75 mm. accompanying gun from
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the Field Artillery Battery. " a:a Smoke screens provided valuable
cover and a defense against antitank guns.
In maneuvers aircraft and armored cars conducted reconnaissance
for the assault echelon of tanks. Upon locating the enemy the tanks
attacked with fire support from its mobile artillery. The infantry
performed mopping up operations and once the objective was reached
consolidated that position. The role of the Mechanized Force that
continued to evolve was the use of the unit's superior strategic
mobility to reach a point of opportunity, where the tactical
mobility facilitated a larger exploitation of a breakthrough. The
destruction and disorganization of the opposing forces was ac-
complished by penetrating the enemy's rear areas to capture an
important objective.
During June 1931 an exercise was designed to further test
marching order and travel procedure, as well as to demonstrate the
strategic mobility of the unit. The Mechanized Forces started from
Fort Eustis and proceeded to Camp Lee. The march was to continue to
Yorktown where they would deploy for combat maneuvers. The journey
from Fort Eustis to Camp Lee covered ninety-one miles in just over
six hours. After a brief rest, a night march took the Force to
Yorktown. The main body arrived at 4:00 a.m., thus completing a
movement of over 150 miles in less than twenty-four hours. 3<4 Even
using obsolete equipment, the Mechanized Force successfully demon-
strated its strategic mobility. Tactical mobility was also
exhibited in various operations.
All the missions assigned to the Mechanized Force emphasized
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mobility. Colonel Van Voorhis, as unit commander, was directed to
experiment with his forces to ascertain proper tactics necessary for
operating fast tanks with other mechanized or motorized units.
Based on the findings of Van Voorhis and others, the War Department
envisioned a perfected mechanized force "to provide higher com-
manders with a powerful weapon of tactical and strategic oppor-
tunity, where the mission indicates the desirability of employing a
force whose characteristics are high tactical and strategic mobil-
ity, hard hitting power, high mobile defensive power, limited
holding power, and one which is capable of sustained independent
action.
"
3= In its one year of existence, the Mechanized Force was
used to achieve those goals, provide practical experience for the
participating men and accumulate valuable data on tanks operating
under field conditions for the Ordnance Department.
The fate of the Mechanized Force was practically sealed when it
began assembling at Fort Eustis. Because the Mechanized Force in
either its present form or a future organization was designed and
operated best independently, it did not fit into the traditional
Army structure. Pro-mechanization officers represented a growing
minority and the independence of mechanized units served as a
catalyst of branch rivalries. Harkening back to the controversy at
the end of the World War I over whether the Tank Corps should remain
independent, mechanized forces challenged the legal authority of the
infantry over all tanks. As previously mentioned, the Infantry felt
it was best qualified to develop tank theory, and it did not need or
want inter-branch or independent help. Opposing independent
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mechanization, General Stephen Fuqua was very vocal, and as Chief of
the Infantry he held sufficient power to lobby effectively against
such ideas.
General Fuqua received considerable support from the Cavalry.
Most cavalry officers allied with an infantry supervised tank
development program because they feared the tank would replace the
horse completely. Notable exceptions were Major Patton, Colonel Van
Voorhis, and General Guy Henery, Chief of the Cavalry. The paradox
for the cavalry officer was the realization of the application of
cavalry tactics/strategy to tanks and the refusal to replace a horse
with a tank.
Before Douglas MacArthur became Chief of Staff in November of
1930, three different groups were trying to control the future of
mechanization within the United States Army. Conservative Infantry
officers saw tanks as support weapons for the foot soldier and
sought to make tanks keep pace with them. The pro-mechanization
officers from all branches tried to develop tank doctrine as a
bipartisan coalition. They saw new performances of tanks as an
indication that tank theory should fundamentally change. Greater
speeds broke the bonds of tanks advancing at infantry pace. Speed
increased the tactical and strategic mobility and created the idea
of an independent self-contained force centered around the tank.
The Cavalry saw the inclusion of a few tank units as beneficial in
helping them to overcome entrenched infantry and wire entanglement
and to allow the horse soldier to continue advancing. Since tanks
were used only as "cavalry support weapons" in special
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circumstances, the Cavalry needed only a few. By 1930,. when Army
mechanization policy changed, the Cavalry had done little with
mechanization.
The change of Army mechanization policy altered the development
of American armored theory. The Chief of Staff directed all
branches, especially the cavalry, to mechanize as much as possible.
The Infantry consolidated full control over tanks operating with the
infantry and continued to oversee development along traditional
lines. The disbanding of the Mechanized Force removed the
experimental laboratory and the impetus for developing an indepen-
dent unit. Under Infantry domination, tank theory stagnated in the
role of providing mobile direct fire support for the infantry. The
only significant development of new theory occurred in the cavalry
with the organization of the Mechanized Cavalry Regiment. New tank
ideas from progressive Infantry officers such as Major Sereno Brett
and Major Bradford Chynoweth found refuge in the mechanized cavalry
The assigning of tanks caused friction with the Infantry and allowed
branch rivalries to increase. By law, all tanks came under Infantry
control, but officials evaded the law by labeling cavalry tanks as
"combat cars." A period of rapid experimentation ended, as if an
infantry theory met a mechanized antithesis and involuntarily formed
a synthesis.
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Chapter IV
SLOW FIGHT AGAINST THE CURRENT, 1931-1942*
When General Douglas MacArthur became Chief of Staff in May,
1931, he changed Army mechanization policy in order to effect a more
efficient program. His memorandum entitled, "General Principles to
Govern Mechanization and Modernization throughout the Army," guided
Army policies for nearly ten years. Many officers in the Cavalry
and Infantry opposed the existence of the Mechanized Force, espe-
cially as an independent one. The Infantry, especially Chief of
Infantry Fuqua, protested against the Force because they feared
losing control over tank units. The Cavalry was concerned with
being totally replaced by mechanized units. By ordering all arms to
mechanize as much as possible, MacArthur hoped to dispel those fears
and foster progress. His decision was based on reasonably sound
premises: that the infantry still needed supporting tanks; and that
the horse was not as effective on the battlefield as it once was, so
the integration of mechanized units was necessary. With both
branches mechanizing to fit their individual missions, less conflict
would occur and more progress would be made. Colonel Van Voorhis,
the commanding officer of the Mechanized Force, objected, arguing
*This chapter introduces a few new terms because some cavalry
designations differ from their infantry equivalents. The Cavalry
referred to tanks assigned to their branch as "combat cars." This
terminology will not be used. Secondly, a cavalry troop was the
same command and strength equivalent as an Infantry company, and a
squadron was the Cavalry's counterpart to the infantry battalion. I
will use the appropriate branch terminology in these instances.
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that branch rivalries would continue to be disruptive and indepen-
dent development was the best way. Van Voorhis assumed that tankers
acted in the interest of their technical service, and were least
qualified to develop doctrine. He feared, that under Infantry or
Cavalry control, each arm would allow progress only in ways which
was beneficial to their branch, and not develop the tanks full
potential. Though later events proved that Van Voorhis reservations
were correct, he was over-ruled.
The General Principles also called for a gradual approach to
mechanizing Army, which helped to hinder tank doctrine development.
Because of the small defense budget caused by the Depression, only
limited funding for the design, testing and procurement of tanks was
allocated. With no hope of necessary funding, the gradual approach
concept fit into the current budgetary restrictions. MacArthur
decided that the Ordnance Department should perfect a suitable tank
that could later be standardized and integrated into the Army in
large numbers. The result of both of these decisions was that the
rate of American progress was further slowed. As previously noted,
without suitable tanks with which to experiment, doctrine could not
advance because current data could not be tested. Tank capabilities
were measured in terms of tanks constructed at the end of World War
I. Newer tanks such as the T1E1 or Christie types ran into problems
in standardization. The Ordnance Department was beset by lack of
funds, rising costs and disputes between the different branches
about the suitable characteristics of tanks. The Infantry naturally
emphasized slower and more heavily armed tanks for infantry
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assaults. On the other hand, the Cavalry desired tanks that
possessed great mobility. Arguments over the merits of the conver-
tible track/wheel system of the Christie tanks further diluted
ordnance efforts. There were even discrepancies between the branch
Chiefs and the Ordnance Department. The using branches emphasized
maneuverability, speed and protective armor, and later in the decade
firepower became a factor. Ordnance officials were more concerned
with perfecting engines and suspension systems. 1 The Infantry
favored tanks with tactical maneuverability and armor protection;
the Cavalry needed machines with less armor but great strategic
mobility. The speed of a tank is governed by the relationship
between horsepower and the total weight of the tank. As more weight
(armor) is added, speed decreases. With contradictory requirements,
it was impossible for the Ordnance Department to produce a suitable
design to satisfy both branches. While efforts were being made to
develop "the perfect tank," units in the field had to be content
with their war surplus machines.
Although Mac Arthur's decisions were based on reasonable
premises, his program failed to reduce branch rivalries. The
Infantry continued to view the tank as its sole possession, and
resented the relabeling of tanks as "combat cars" for Cavalry use.
With the change of Army policy, mechanization was forced upon many
in the Cavalry. The fear of mechanized units replacing horse units
remained, but, it was abated somewhat because the Cavalry controlled
mechanization for its own branch. The result was infighting: the
Infantry trying to regain control over all tanks, and the Cavalry
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divided between needing some tanks and wanting only horses. As
Colonel Van Voorhis argued, the desire to advance and protect one's
branch interests became more important than the progression and
exploration of mechanized warfare concepts. Branch rivalries, a
gradual approach philosophy, and a lack of a suitable modern tank
were the causes delaying the development of American tank theory in
the thirties.
The "General F'rinciples" effected few changes in the develop-
ment of infantry tank doctrine. The Infantry was assigned to
concentrate on developing machines that increased the striking power
of infantry units against strongly held positions. Essentially, the
Infantry had staunchly adhered to an identical policy since American
entrance into World War I. Conforming to the Infantry-dominated
combined arms approach to warfare, Infantry tank doctrine continued
to concentrate on refining the cooperation between tanks and
riflemen. All officers taking the Infantry Company Officers course
received instruction in tank tactics so that they could better
understand the employment and limitations of the tank.
The smallest administrative organization remained the Company
unit, from which individual platoons were attached to battalions for
combat support. This structure remained unchanged from the founding
of the Tank Corps in 1917 until 1339. By the end of the decade,
infantry doctrine changed to employing tanks en masse in support of
the foot soldiers. The Chief of Infantry, General George A. Lynch,
authorized the assembling of the light tank companies into bat-
talion-strength units in August 1939. This move was designed to
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ease command and control problems and to allow for a larger number
of tank units to be made available from the more plentiful defense
budgets. F'rior to this change, tank companies from the same
divisional structure were parceled out to different posts across the
United States. The reorganization did not change the role of
infantry tanks but was a reaction to administrative difficulties,
slightly enhanced mission capabilities of new model tanks, and the
perceived poor survivability of tanks on the battlefield owing to
the abundance of antitank guns in infantry formations. All tank
units remained part of the GHQ reserve, waiting for allotment to
Army Corps, and divisions.
The Army saw infantry tanks as essentially an offensive weapon
to be used in assaults or counter-attacks. According to the Field
Service Regulations of 1S39, tanks provide higher commanders with a
powerful maneuvering force with which to influence the course of
combat. To take full advantage of tank's potential, they must be
assigned to divisions operating in favorable tank terrain (i.e., not
in swamps), be assigned well-defined objectives, and attacks be
launched with surprise and be employed in mass. 2 The Regulations
also states the standard mission of tanks as assisting ". . .
the advance of infantry foot troops, either preceding or accompany-
ing the infantry assault echelon. They attack successive objectives
which coincide with those of the supported infantry foot troops.
. .
.
"
3 By sharing objectives, it was assured that the mass of
tanks engaged on the part of the front where the main attack is
being made. This was important for conducting successful combined
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arms operations.
Throughout the thirties, infantry officers sought to improve
infantry and tank cooperation. Considerations about tank formation
deployment focused on how tanks could quickly provide accurate fire
support; yet, not be tied to the infantry so closely that they lost
their tactical mobility advantage and became vulnerable to antitank
weapons. Continuing to think within the Army's future war concept
of a combined arms approach, the Infantry theorized how tanks could
best be used in support of the infantry. Conservatism within the
Infantry ranks prevented asking the essential question—what is the
proper method of employing tanks to take full advantage of the
capabilities of the new tanks? The Army dealt with tanks and
mechanization as more effectively performing traditional missions,
rather than investigating if they produced a change in the tradi-
tional missions. The Army consciously permitted the fitting of new
technology into traditional roles and an existing structure.
From the perspective of the Infantry, the Civil War in Spain
(1936-1939) furnished factual proof that independent tank actions
would not succeed on a modern battlefield. Advocates of mechaniza-
tion argued that the tanks were not properly employed. The threat
of 37 mm. antitank guns, which were capable of penetrating one-inch
armor plate at 500 yards, emphasized the need to concentrate tanks
in mass to achieve maximum firepower and shock value. The war also
began to shift opinion to favor heavier tanks instead of the light
tanks. The Infantry consolidated its tank units into larger
formations in 1939, but the formations did not gain the sel f-
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sufficient capabilities that officers Sereno Brett and Bradford
Chynoweth advocated for c^/er a decade. Most in the Infantry refused
to see the tank as anything other than an infantry support weapon.
The new Field Service Regulations directed that tank formations
in an attack be organized in several echelons and deployed in waves.
A standard 1*939 infantry tank action envisioned "the advance of the
leading echelon [medium tanks if available] is carefully coordinated
with the supporting fire of the artillery and heavy infantry
weapons. These tanks have the mission of dominating the hostile
antitank guns. The second echelon, closely followed by the foot
troops, advances with the mission of dominating the enemy's machine
guns; these are the accompanying tanks that break into the hostile
position with the assault echelon."'4 Comparing this assault to the
ones conducted during World War I clearly shows how little tank
doctrine differed after twenty years.
Tank doctrine under Infantry control did not advance as much as
it was refined. The Army concluded after World War I that the next
war would be fought by large infantry armies attacking on parallel
routes, supported by artillery, tanks, and aircraft. The Infantry
sought to develop tanks and tank tactics that would work best within
the Army's future war concept. This assumption was strictly adhered
to during the thirties. All three Chiefs of Infantry during the
thirties strongly believed that this policy was correct. Generals
Fuqua, Croft, and Lynch saw the tank as an infantry support weapon
to destroy any organized resistance holding up the infantry. No
thought was given to bypassing centers of resistance and isolating
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the frontline troops from their command and supply organizations.
With Infantry leadership firmly believing in the Army's future war
concept, tank doctrine was not allowed to develop more mobile forms
of employment. In order to strengthen Infantry control over tank
doctrine, the Tank School was moved from Fort Meade to Fort Benning,
Georgia, where it became the tank section of the Infantry School.
High ranking Infantry officers were alarmed at War Department
flirtation with independent tank formations in 1928 and 1931. Those
mechanized forces threatened the Infantry's exclusive control over
the tank and revived fear of the creation of a new branch. Most
officers agreed that without tank support, infantry could not
advance on the modern battlefield. If the Army was to conduct
operations according to its future war concept, then it was impera-
tive that the Infantry retain control over tank units and doctrine.
The tank originally was adapted to support the infantry; the
infantry currently used tanks; and therefore, the infantry was best
qualified to develop tank doctrine. The conservative leadership of
the high ranking Infantry officers only allowed tank doctrine to
develop along principles that fulfilled the Infantry's role within
the Army's future war concept.
The Army's new mechanization policy forced the Cavalry to think
about and implement its own mechanization. General MacArthur, as
Chief of Staff, directed the Cavalry to develop combat vehicles
(tanks and armored cars) that enhanced the cavalry's roles of
reconnaissance, counter-reconnaissance, flank actions, exploita-
tions, and other traditional cavalry missions. The "General
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Principles" of Mechanization disbanded the Mechanized Force and
temporarily settled the issue of developing alternative theories for
employing tanks as a mobile and independent force. With the issuing
of the "General Principles" on May 1, 1931, the Cavalry became
responsible for developing mechanized theories that employed
mobility, shock action and firepower, the mission that was previous-
ly assigned to the mechanized force.* It was only through the
Cavalry that tank theory continued to advance in the United States.
Cavalry officers did not accept tank units into their branch
without reservations. Mechanized units employing outdated equipment
had not displayed performances to convince all that tanks were the
only future for the Cavalry. Skeptics in the Cavalry cited that
noise, problems during night marches, and uselessness in swampy
terrain limited the employment of tanks. These were valid criti-
cisms of the tank; but machines did have certain advantages over the
horse. The one common denominator was that they were governed by
the same principles in combat. Most Cavalry officers agreed, and
the point of dissension centered on the extent to which tanks could
operate with Cavalry units. There were those who opposed integrat-
ing tanks into the Cavalry at all. Prejudiced for sentimental
reasons, they did not see the horse as having limitations on the
battlefield; nor did they want the Cavalry or the horse to be
replaced.
•Funding was previously allocated for the establishment and
training of a mechanized force in fiscal year 1931 which actually
began in 1930. This is why the Mechanized Force continued to exist
in 1931 after the change of policy.
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The pro-mechanization faction in the Cavalry found an important
supporter in the Chief of Cavalry, General Guy V. Henry, Jr. When
mechanization policy changed, he gladly accepted the addition of
mechanized units into his arm and thought that tanks could augment
horse units without changing the traditional mission of the Caval-
ry. 3 Because horses were not bullet proof and tank performance
still cast doubts on its range of employment, the Cavalry embraced
the employment of mechanized and horse units.
The principles and theories that were studied in the Experimen-
tal Mechanized Force in 1928 and by the Mechanized Force in 1931
became the legacy of the mechanized cavalry regiment after the
Army's change of mechanized policy. The mechanized cavalry regiment
was the primary mechanized formation of the decade in the United
States. From the experiments that had been conducted, the officers
assigned to the mechanized cavalry regiment eventually developed the
tactical and operational doctrine employed by American armored
divisions during World War II.
Prior to 1931, the Cavalry as a branch had done little toward
mechanization except to make observations. They did experiment with
an armored car troop for enhancing the reconnaissance element. When
the Cavalry was given tanks for developing mechanization from within
its own branch, it turned to traditional cavalry values for
guidance. Mechanized cavalry units were instilled with the cavalry
philosophy of making quick estimates and decisions. Mounted men
have an advantage over dismounted opponents because they possess
superior mobility, and are better able to maneuver for position.
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Additionally, a stationary target is easier to hit, so movement
increases safety by decreasing hit probability. Robert Grow, who
served with the Mechanized Cavalry Regiment and commander of an
Armored Division in France during World War II, echoed the desire to
think mounted, because on the battlefield there were no fox-holes
for horses. 6 The flexible command structure that developed bore
these imprints.
The Cavalry's plans for mechanization was to equip one regiment
immediately and another as soon as funding permitted, thus
establishing the strength at brigade level. This is significant
because brigade size units had not been employed since the war by
the infantry, the decision indicates the Cavalry was interested in
using tanks in large formations rather than parceling them through-
out the cavalry.
Before the Cavalry could activate its first mechanized regiment
a few changes had to be made. Briefly, the 1st Cavalry regiment,
stationed at Fort Russell, Mar fa, Texas was chosen for mechaniza-
tion. A year passed, however, before this actually began. Fort
Eustis was deemed to be inadequate for the regiment's purposes, so a
new station was chosen at Camp Knox, Kentucky. Camp Knox contained
33,000 acres within which to conduct exercises. Politically it was
not acceptable to move the 1st Cavalry to Kentucky until the
elections in the fall of 1932 were over. The loss of civilian jobs
associated with the closing of the military installation would not
make the area voters happy, and might express their disapproval the
next time they voted. Meanwhile, a Mechanized Cavalry Detachment
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was formed from the troops in the Mechanized Force. The Mechanized
Cavalry Detachment conducted further training during the summer of
1331 and moved the unit to Camp Knox in November. Just after
Christmas 1932, part of the detachment supervised the movement of
the 1st Cavalry to Kentucky. The Mechanized Cavalry Detachment
gained additional training and experience in conducting long
marches, and it became the instructing cadre when the 1st Cavalry
arrived. Colonel Van Voorhis was appointed the Regimental Commander
and Chaffee became the Regimental Executive Officer. Colonel Van
Voorhis brought experience from commanding the Mechanized Force with
him, and he provided leadership and exceptional administrative
skills during the early days; but he had little effect on the direct
development of doctrine. Adna Chaffee had become a strong supporter
of mechanization, and he was the strongest driving force in the
evolution of tank theory in the United States after 1932. His
promotion of larger mechanized forces, and his influences in
organization and development of tactics earned him the label "the
father of the Armored Force.
"
The original tables of organization for the regiment contained
a "covering squadron" composed of an armored car troop and a tank
troop (scouting). This squadron's assignment was to do reconnais-
sance and to screen the combat formations from enemy detection. The
other squadron was the "Combat Car squadron," containing two troops
of tanks that formed the striking power of the regiment. A machine
gun troop functioned as a holding section to increase defensive
power. A headquarters troop and supply vehicle composed the
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remainder of the unit. From the composition we see that the force
was structured to seek an opponent and then strike at it. The
organization also illustrates the design to use the regiment along
with horse cavalry in the traditional role rather than an indepen-
dent one. The artillery and support echelons were dropped from the
Mechanized Force organization, so essentially the mechanized cavalry
regiment was similar to the heavy cavalry of Napoleon.
Based on observations of other countries' attempts at mechaniz-
ing, American studies, and field testing, the Cavalry began to study
mechanization academically. The Cavalry School at Fort Riley,
Kansas based a 1933 manual entitled, Mechanized Cavalry , on these
past experiences. The manual specified that "the principle duty of
tanks in cooperation with cavalry is to assist the advance of the
latter when held up by machine gun fire." 7 Mechanized regiments
were considered as an extension of that branch and were not seen as
a new or independent force. The manual clearly stated this in a
sentence following the description of the mechanized duty: "they
[tank units] will be given definite localities to subdue and will
not be sent out with a roving commission to seek out objectives."
The manual also makes a distinction between armored cars, combat
cars, and tanks. According to the Cavalry
those motor vehicles essentially of high road mobility and long
radius of action, having firepower and protective armor, and
whose mission is essentially reconnaissance, are hereafter
designated armored cars. . . . Those types of armored vehicles
having essentially fighting missions, including shock-action,
and possessing firepower and comparatively heavier armor
protection, and a high degree of cross-country mobility, are
hereafter designated combat cars. . . . Those motor vehicles
having a comparatively short range of action, greater power of
90
shock action, and a greater amount of protective armor are
designated as tanks. Tanks are normally employed by infantry.*
The mechanized cavalry regiment centered on the employment of
fast tanks, and the organization was structured to meet the tactical
and administrative requirements in a self-contained fighting unit.
Built around the combat car squadron, all other elements provided
assistance for the squadron on the battlefield. The smallest
tactical unit was the tank platoon composed of a command tank, three
other tanks, and a self-propelled gun.
Experts acknowledged the lack of holding power of tanks (a
lesson demonstrated conclusively in World War I) and sought to
remedy this with the addition of machine gun units. Machine gun
troops supported tanks by establishing fire superiority in holding
attacks or defensive hold missions. Suitable missions included
temporarily occupying the ground secured by a combat car troop, and
covering the reorganization of that troop or, if necessary, its
withdrawal. The machine gun troop contained three platoons, making
it possible ". . . to utilize one to follow up and consolidate the
gains of each combat car troop, while the third is available to
cover an exposed flank, to reen force either of the first two, or to
assist in the consolidation of the entire position." 10 The
inclusion of machine gun units provided firepower from a fixed
position to support tanks or free them to regain their mobility.
The mechanized cavalry regiment was an integrated fighting
force designed to operate together. One element sought out the
enemy, one provided striking power and another the holding power.
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Organized in this way, the mechanized cavalry regiment was not ". .
. susceptible to subdivision into two or more independent tactical
units without materially weakening the effectiveness of the
whole." 11 The Cavalry was attempting to follow Army guidelines of
mechanizing its branch as far as possible.
Mechanized cavalry sought to apply Cavalry characteristics of
mobility, firepower, and shock to mot or -propel led fighting units
equipped predominantly with armored vehicles. 12 From this base,
proper tactics and doctrine, composition of force, and compatibility
with horse formations were examined. One deficiency that continued
to occupy the attention of officers was establishing a balance
between combat vehicles and supply vehicles. The 1st Cavalry
Regiment had not been at Fort Knox for four months before it became
apparent some changes were needed in the unit's tables of organiza-
tion. The unit lacked acceptable firepower and its supply vehicles
proved to be awkward to control. To increase firepower a third
squadron of tanks was organized. All supply vehicles were removed
from the combat squadrons and organized into a separate echelon.
The number of supply vehicles were reduced. In the first year the
top priority of the regiment was to expand the facilities at Fort
Knox and to construct adequate housing for the troops. The oppor-
tunity to study employment and doctrine came in 1934 when the
regiment marched to Fort Riley, Kansas to conduct maneuvers.
Analysis of the Fort Riley maneuvers and exercises held at Fort
Knox during 1934 highlighted deficiencies in flexibility and
offensive power. Solutions were attempted when the Secretary of War
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approved new tables of organization on April 26, 1934. The recom-
mendations had the support of the Regimental officers and the Chief
of Cavalry. Under reorganization, the number of tanks increased
from forty-two to fifty-six, a battalion of the 68th Field artillery
and a 4.2 inch mortar unit were added to increase the firepower of
the regiment. The holding power of the machine gun troop improved
by adding a rifle platoon. These changes sought to improve the
offensive power of the unit. Improvements to facilitate better
command and control reduced the number of tanks in a platoon from
five to three tanks. Eliminating the scout troop and reassigning
its units to the combat car and machine gun squadrons allowed better
reconnaissance within the regiment. The last change consolidated
all supply and maintenance vehicles from the headquarters and combat
car troops into a service troop. 13
These changes did provide more offensive power and flexibility
to the unit, but they also indicate a slight modification of
doctrine. Before the new tables were issued, the regiment was
divided into three separate functioning squadrons—reconnaissance,
strike (tanks), and holding. The new tables of organization
eliminated the reconnaissance squadron and gave reconnaissance
capability to the strike and holding squadrons. For the tank units,
this meant a reduced time between locating an opponent and engaging
in combat. Doctrine was beginning to shift from seeking and
striking operations to two self-contained independent strike
formations with a holding contingent. The combat car squadrons were
no longer composed solely of tanks, but contained reconnaissance and
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artillery elements for support. Having two squadrons of tanks with
support elements attached was the beginning of the Command striking
unit concept that developed into the Combat Command structure of the
later thirties.
The Fort Riley maneuvers also produced results other than those
on the tables of organization of a mechanized unit. The maneuvers
sought to explore the question: to what extent could mechanized
cavalry units replace horse cavalry? Relevant to the answer was
another question: could horse and mechanized cavalry operate
together? These inquiries arose in those forms because most
military pundits did not believe that the era of the horse was at an
end. The strategic mobility of the mechanized unit proved to be far
superior to the horse units. In fact, one exercise was cancelled
because of the condition of the horses. The different rates of
march also necessitated bivouacking mechanized three times further
behind the horse regiment in order to ensure the arrival of both at
the objective at precisely the same time. 1 "4 Few observers recog-
nized the limitations of the horse units.
The maneuvers revealed deficiencies in supporting units and
exposed many young officers to the possibilities of mechanized
cavalry. In seeking solutions, the idea of mechanized units was
suppressed by the desire to fit mechanization into the existing
structure of the different branches. Just as theories about using
independent mechanized forces sprang up in the late twenties,
theories and articles again raised the question of exploiting the
full potential of mechanized cavalry through independent actions.
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While arguments and maneuvers did not change Cavalry or Army policy,
officers who agreed did occupy higher positions in the Army than in
1928 or 1920, when similar recommendations were advanced; and could
exert the influence of their positions to advance mechanized policy
along acceptable lines. The acceptance of a unit resembling an
Armored division still had a long, hard way to go. Before the Army
began thinking in these terms more basic elements and principles
needed to be developed and perfected.
The larger numbers of antitank guns and greater penetration of
shells mandated improved training and awareness for tankers about
antitank guns. Major Robert W. Grow, the Regimental Executive
Officer in 1934, noted that ". . . combat cars tended to stop in
exposed positions to fire rather than to move forward continually,
firing at targets as they appeared. If the vehicle must stop, it
should do so in a defilade position or at least under cover to
lessen its chances of being destroyed by antitank guns." 13 The
threat of antitank guns and artillery was well remembered from World
War I. Firing on the move to provide a more difficult target to hit
for antitank gunner was also an accepted practice. By 1934, smoke
was seen as the way to neutralize antitank weapons, that during
maneuvers, no attack was initiated without first firing a simulated
smoke screen. 1 * The Cavalry continued to refine tactical doctrine
before dealing with larger formations.
After the addition of the second combat car squadron, a new
combat command arrangement began to take form in order to improve
the combat flexibility and performance of the regiment. The
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conception of "combat commands" was the idea of Chaffee, and
originated from maneuvers and exercises, especially those in
Kansas. 17 Combat commands were tactical headquarters to which any
number of battalions could be attached. In this way, the regiment
could temporarily be reconfigured to meet different assignments
which probably required a different composition of troops.
Flexibility was increased and the more economical employment of
troops enhanced the strength of the unit. Because the commanding
officer was assigning tactical headquarters, the subordinate in
command received greater tactical responsibility. This placed the
officer making decisions relatively closer to the action and
situation, allowing orders according to the situation to be effected
quicker. Radio, aerial command, and ground communication (mes-
sengers) became increasingly important for the commanding officer to
maintain overall command of the regiment and to keep informed of
changes in the developing situation. The system that evolved, and
while carried over into armored divisions, was the establishment of
combat commands A, B, and Reserve within the Regiment.
The Second Army maneuvers of 1936 held in Allegan, Michigan,
and Fort Knox, Kentucky, produced significant changes in the
structure and employment of mechanized cavalry. The maneuvers
established the soundness of the regiments' tactical organization
and command. However, the continued deficiencies of support element
was also illustrated. Like the 1934 Fort Riley maneuvers, the need
for engineering, motorized infantry, and additional artillery as
organic units to the regiment remained. An engineer detachment was
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necessary for overcoming obstacles, especially water courses, and to
reinforce bridges. Motorized infantry were essential to increase
holding power and to perform infantry functions that mounted troops
could not accomplish—such as delaying attacking infantry, mopping
up operations, guarding prisoners, and protecting artillery from
attack. 1 ® Mechanised Cavalry officers saw these changes as neces-
sary to round out and balance the mechanized cavalry regiments.
Prior to the addition of motorized infantry for maneuvers, mecha-
nized cavalry had conducted only two forms of attacks—assault in
echelon or fire fights. Assault in echelons employed similar
tactics as the leading tank doctrine of the infantry. Tanks
attacked in waves or in line depending on the organization of the
defense. A fire fight utilized the main armament of tanks to fire
directly on an objective. Fire and movement were used to gain fire
superiority against a target in order to destroy or force the
defenders to withdraw. Foot troops accompanying tank formations
increased the combat potential of the force.
By 1936, it became evident to officers in the 1st Cavalry that
to perfect mechanized cavalry it should contain a similar composi-
tion as the disbanded Mechanized Force. Note that a great number of
the Mechanized Force officers and enlisted men formed the nucleus of
the 1st Cavalry (Mechanized) Regiment. From the Infantry's view-
point, the specter of an independent mechanized force was beginning
to materialize again, though not in exactly the same form. Mecha-
nized cavalry was evolving away from its original concept of
operating with horse cavalry units, and moving in the direction of
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independent operations and a new branch. While the mechanized
regiment was based on cavalry principles, doctrine was combining
infantry and artillery, along with support functions, to create a
self-contained fighting unit that employed basic concepts from all
branches.
The refining of mechanized cavalry doctrine in 1935-37 occurred
during a time when the Chief of Cavalry supported mechanization.
Chaffee, as Chief of the Budget and Legislative Planning Branch of
the War Department, was in a very influential position to channel
funds for mechanization. The Cavalry in 1936 added signal,
ordnance, quartermaster, and more artillery to the 1st Regiment.
Later that year, the 13th Cavalry at Fort Riley was mechanized and
moved to Fort Knox. For the first time since World War I, the U.S.
Army was consolidating tanks in Brigade strength. In contrast the
largest infantry tank organization was the battalion. The
mechanized Brigade would not participate in Army maneuvers until the
First Army maneuvers in 1939. Until then development concentrated
on perfecting tactics and organization.
Chaffee possessed the charisma and tactical ability to provide
a continuing motivating force. But mechanized cavalry doctrine
evolved from the labors of many officers, mostly within the mecha-
nized cavalry units. Sereno Brett (infantry tanks), an instructor
at the Command and General Staff School at Fort Leavenworth,
continued to advocate a powerful mobile force, strong in firepower
and armor, for use in rapid attacks against hostile rear areas. 1 *
Timothy Nenninger, in his thesis, was able to correspond with and
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interview a number of officers formerly associated with the mecha-
nized cavalry. They contended that it was Chaffee, Van Voorhis,
Palmer, Scott, Crittenberger , and Grow who collaborated to develop
doctrine. Mechanized Cavalry doctrine, while based on traditional
horse cavalry principles, evolved more out of discussions, tests,
and maneuvers. 20 The First Army maneuvers held in Plattsburg, New
York proved that the doctrine they were developing followed sound
and workable principles. During maneuvers (the first to use a
mechanized brigade), the 7th Cavalry Brigade outflanked the Black
Army and attacked with decisive results their lines of communication
and supply. Even though the Black Army was short of antitank guns,
the exercise proved to many that the 7th Cavalry Brigade could
affect an entire Army The utility of the Brigade was partially lost
because the idea of mechanized units was officially unpopular as a
few years before.
The surge of a more independent role for mechanized units
occurred just before leadership within the Army changed to restrict
the growing independence of mechanized cavalry. In 193B Major
General John K. Herr became Chief of Cavalry. General Herr was much
less friendly toward mechanized cavalry than the previous Chiefs of
Cavalry had been. The war in Spain and the independent nature of
the 7th Brigade prompted a reassessment of the War Department's
mechanization policy. During this reassessment, inter- and intra-
branch rivalries surfaced again to slow mechanized development and
expansion.
The Chief of Staff, General Marlin Craig, ordered the study of
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Army mechanization in order to determine whether infantry and
cavalry tank units were accomplishing their assigned missions and
whether mechanized units required further expansion. General Craig
was concerned that obvious duplication of tanks, and to a certain
extent of mission, was wasting funds. From his viewpoint, "...
dividing responsibility for tank development between the two
branches led to a wide variety of technical ideas and no clear-cut
policy of development." 21 These were exactly the same concerns
Colonel Van Voorhis had expressed six years earlier when Army policy
changed. If mechanization was not being developed to its fullest
potential, the Chief of Staff was contemplating a return to an
independent mechanized force to ensure that developments kept pace
with developments in other nations. This only resurrected fears of
independent forces (or new branches) and started branch rivalries.
The new Chief of Cavalry, who opposed mechanized cavalry, created an
intra-service rivalry within the Cavalry. These events stalled the
expansion of the Mechanized Brigade to division strength until 1940,
and they retarded doctrinal growth for the rest of the decade.
The inter-service rivalry centered on the desire of both Arms
to retain control over their tank units. Neither the Infantry nor
the Cavalry, especially after General Herr became Chief of Cavalry,
wanted to expand its own tank units at the expense of foot or horse
troops. Both Chiefs refused to admit that mechanized troops
constituted an entirely new arm or an independent force. Because
the Branch Chiefs determined the priorities for allocating funds,
they could exert influence on the rate of development.
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Brigadier General George P. Tyner, the Assistant Chief of
Staff, prepared the study on tanks and mechanized units for the
Chief of Staff. The report encompassed history, the current status
of units, the impact of the war in Spain, trends in mechanized
warfare in other countries, and recommendations for the future of
U.S. mechanized units. Evidence supported that the U.S. Army was
lagging behind in mechanization; and the report recommended that
current Army mechanization policy be altered slightly in order to
keep pace with developments in European countries. Action favored
restating War Department policy to apply mechanization only to
certain units instead of a general mechanization throughout the
Army. The tactical doctrine governing the employment of tank,
mechanized units, and anti-mechanized defense needed clarifica-
tion. 22 The report advocated reorganizing existing tank structures.
Infantry tank companies were removed from control of Infantry
division and reformed into an Infantry tank division for administra-
tive purposes. Another cavalry regiment was to be mechanized to
create and organize a mechanized division. The division was to be
self-contained and consist of a divisional headquarters troop, a
mechanized reconnaissance squadron, a mechanized cavalry brigade
composed of three regiments, and the necessary supporting and
service troops. 23 The development and participation of attack and
observation aircraft was highly recommended.
Based on these recommendations the War Department modified its
mechanization policy to allow the tanks in both arms to develop
better their full potential. Under the new policy, infantry tanks
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still were to engage in close combat and to overcome strongly
organized resistance. Yet the leading tanks were not allowed to
operate beyond the range of infantry or artillery, that is to
conduct independent missions. The assigned role for mechanized
cavalry departed from the 1931 policy, and exhibited the charac-
teristics of an independent, self-contained force capable of distant
strategic employment. 24* Both the Infantry and Cavalry retained
control over the tanks in their respective branches. This direc-
tive, "Policies Governing Mechanization," sanctioned the development
of mechanized cavalry as a more independent strategic force. But,
because the new Chief of Cavalry was opposed to the expansion of
mechanized cavalry or its role, little progress was made toward
catching up to other countries. With both the Chiefs of Cavalry and
Infantry opposed to the idea of independent mechanized formations,
it took a combined effort of all pro-mechanization officers to make
any progress in expanding the mechanized cavalry. In fact, it took
the German invasions of Poland and France to produce speedy results.
The war in Spain affected the development of American tank
doctrine very little, but it did influence significantly American
tank design. The Spanish Civil War was one of the reasons prompting
General Craig to question the current state of American mechaniza-
tion, which resulted in the study by Brig. General Tyner. The
reports from Spain had little effect on the development of tank
doctrine because American officers concluded that the tanks were not
employed correctly or in sufficient numbers. The most important
impact of the Spanish Civil War was on the design of American tanks.
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Light tanks were proven to be highly susceptible to antitank guns,
thus stimulating the development of the medium class of tanks. In
general, tanks employed in Spain outgunned and outweighed all
American designs. Future designs added armor and centered on the 37
mm. tank gun as a main armament. Tanks armed with only machine guns
were observed to be inadequate to meet conditions on the modern
battlefield. The war in Spain furnished much technical data on the
characteristics of tanks in combat conditions. Too few tanks were
used in combat to provide conclusive data about tank operations to
cause changes in doctrine.
The Second Army maneuvers in 1939 clearly demonstrated the
potential of mechanized forces. The Brigade demonstrated it was
capable of performing deep strategic penetrations that could have
decisive results. Supporters of mechanized cavalry lobbied that the
command structure of the Brigade had not reached its command limits,
and they recommended the expansion to division level. In combat,
the tank remained the striking power of the unit. But the combat
car squadrons were most effective as a combat team with other
supporting elements. The inclusion of infantry, artillery, avia-
tion, and engineers in support of tanks continued to be more heavily
stressed. The search for proper composition to create a self-
contained force capable of conducting deep operations against the
enemy's strategic command and communications occupied the officers
of the Brigade.
Tank doctrine again stalled when certain high ranking officials
opposed mechanization in some key respects. General Herr refused to
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sanction the expansion of the Mechanised Brigade at the expense of
any horse units. Between the 1939 Second Army maneuvers and the
Third Army maneuvers in May 1940, the Chiefs of Infantry and Cavalry
competed for funds to expand their own tank units without reducing
infantry or horse units. The desire for expansion was prompted by
the German success against the Poles. Chaffee and other officers
were advocating a more powerful formation to carry out strategic
missions of an independent nature for more than a year.
Brig. General Chaffee tirelessly lobbied for the continued
expansion of the mechanized cavalry force. Chaffee called for
immediate action in an address before the Army War College on
September 29, 1939. He expressed the opinion that it was "impera-
tive that we do so without much delay, but I do not believe it
absolutely essential that we follow either the German, the French or
the British in the organization." 23 The Army agreed that mechanized
cavalry was developing along sound principles. Mechanized Cavalry
officers believed that the expansion of the 7th Brigade would keep
the U.S. Army current with their contemporaries in Europe
—
actually
only a little behind. Chaffee, along with other officers, believed
that "a Mechanized Brigade or armored division is essentially an
instrument for the offensive. Its holding power is both limited and
temporary. When on defense it holds with only a small fraction and
counterattacks locally with its mobile elements." 26 The Polish
Campaign merely provided American officers with a graphic example of
the decisiveness of mechanized forces, a principle that already
became apparent during the Second Army maneuvers.
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American concepts about a mechanized or armored division were
based on traditional American principles—those that emerged from
the experiences with the Experimental Mechanized Force, Mechanized
Force, and mechanized cavalry. Any future development would happen
along similar lines. Chaffee's War College address analyzed the
German Armored Division and found it comparable to the proposed
mechanized division.
We have examined the proposed mechanized cavalry division
in comparison with the German armored division and found that
it contains all of the essential basic elements of the latter.
Numerically, it is not as strong, either in tanks or in the
holding or supporting elements, as the German armored division,
but in quality of its armor vehicles, on the average I believe
it excels the German armored division, and in proportion it has
more gun power. Under our conception I believe it to be a more
mobile and easily directed organization than the German armored
division. 2*"7
With the experience of the maneuvers, plus the analysis of the
Polish Campaign, heavy pressure by Brigade officers mounted for the
immediate expansion of the 7th Cavalry Brigade to a mechanized
division. Because the Cavalry Brigade possessed more experience
with higher echelons, it was assumed the cavalry would supervise the
expansion. Direct expansion of mechanized units waited as branch
rivalries continued to flare.
The mechanized cavalry was able to expand temporarily to
division status for participation in the Third Army maneuver being
held during May 1340 in Louisiana. Chaffee and Third Army Commander
Major General Stanley D. Embick successfully persuaded War Depart-
ment officials to form a provisional tank regiment from the existing
Infantry tank companies, and an infantry regiment to the 7th Cavalry
10!
Brigade. The improvised Armored Division contained the personnel of
a structured division, but was not balanced in composition. There
were too many tanks and not enough infantry, artillery, or
engineers. The habitual need for more infantry and support echelons
during maneuvers, provided further evidence that combined arms
formations were more powerful than strictly all tank formations.
The F'rovisional Tank Brigade (Infantry) was attached to the 7th
Cavalry Brigade and was commanded by Brig. General Bruce Magruder.
The F'rovisional Brigade contained one regiment and two battalions of
light tanks, and one company of medium tanks. The Improvised
Armored Division contained all the tank units the Army possessed
except for a company stationed in Washington and one in Hawaii. The
command and control structure worked effectively, proving that
larger formations could be commanded under this system of organiza-
tion.
The structuring of the mechanized cavalry Brigade, and conse-
quently the mechanized division, to perform in an independent role
in order to participate in deep penetrations to achieve strategic
decision denotes some changes in American tank doctrine. The
Americans were developing their own version for mechanized units to
operate along the principles set forth by Liddell Hart. The nature
of the tank was allowed to change under Cavalry control from a
weapon reducing strong points to a force to find and break through
weak spots so as to penetrate into the rear areas in order to cut
supply and communication lines, and to attack reserve areas and
command posts. This principle was made official in the 1941 Cavalry
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Field Manual, FM 2-10
.
which defined the Armored troops combat
mission as seeking "... to go where the going is good, and to
outflank enemy centers of resistance rather than to attack directly.
This rule applies to both the armored platoon and troop."20 The
traditional elements of mobility and shock are still evident values.
One remaining problem was the proper proportion of infantry to
tanks. Chaffee noted in 1939 that the 7th Brigade was ". . . in
need of additional holding power and of supporting power in the form
of additional machine gun and rifle units. " :2 'a Exercises were
conducted to determine the proper proportion. Cavalry officers
feared that if too much ground support was added the unit might be
drawn into a prolonged combat, which eliminated the advantage of
maneuverability the Mechanized Brigade possessed. 30 Adjustments to
the ratio were not solved by the Third Army maneuvers, and changes
continued throughout World War II.
The performance and potential of the improvised armored
division impressed commanders and observers with the need for large
mechanized or armored divisions. The opening of the German offen-
sive in the West underscored this point and strengthened the belief
that America needed mechanized/armored divisions immediately. On
May 25, 1940, a group of officers met in the basement of a high
school in Alexandria, Louisiana to discuss the future of mechaniza-
tion. In attendance were Chaffee, Magruder, Brett, Patton, and
Frank M. Andrews, the Assistant Chief of Staff Q-3. Assessing the
maneuvers and developments in France and Belgium, they determined
that the War Department could no longer delay the development of
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independent mechanised divisions free from both Infantry and Cavalry
control. Andrews expressed the conclusions of those present to
General George C. Marshall, the current Chief of Staff. On June 10,
1940, General Marshal convened a meeting to determine plans for the
organization of a separate armored force. The different terminology
indicated that a new approach was contemplated and signified a break
with past Army Infantry and Cavalry doctrine on mechanization. In
attendance were the Chief of Staff, Assistant Chiefs of Staff, the
branch chiefs, representatives of the War Plans Division of the
General Staff, and mechanized cavalry and infantry tank officers.
Over the objections of the Chiefs of Cavalry and of Infantry, a
separate Armored Force was created from all existing tank units. In
practice, a new branch was created but was termed "armored force" to
avoid legislative restrictions (only congress had the power to
create a new branch). General Chaffee was appointed Chief of the
Armored Force, and given the powers and responsibilities of a branch
chief. The Armored Force was officially established on July 10,
1940. The 7th Mechanized Brigade became the 1st Armored Division
under the command of Colonel Bruce Maqruder. The infantry tank
units at Fort Benning formed the nucleus of the 2nd Armored Division
under Colonel Charles L. Scott. Together they formed the 1st
Armored Corps.
The new division was organized with an armored brigade contain-
ing two regiments of light tanks, one regiment of medium tanks in
two battalions, and a regiment of field artillery for support. The
division contained a mechanized infantry regiment and one extra
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battalion of artillery, plus support units (i.e., engineers, signal
company, etc.). The Brigade commander was responsible for structur-
ing the combat units composition according to the missions assiqned.
Infantry and artillery would be assigned to tank units as the
mission might require. In the Army's rush to create an Armored
division, it extended the mechanized brigade structure to the
division level. The composition of the division reveals that the
Army was accepting a combined arms approach to tank warfare at a
division level, rather than strictly an all-tank division. The
divisional command structure contained flaws that became apparent
when the 1st Armor Corps participated in Army maneuvers in 1941.
The Brigade organization formed an extra link in the chain of
command and reduced the quickness of decision of the division. This
resulted in a restructuring of the division in 1942, which entailed
replacing the brigade structure with a regimental form. Instead of
combat teams being assigned by the brigade command, there were now
two combat commands under the direction of a brigadier general. The
combat commands contained no permanent troops, but the brigadier
general of a command was allotted a tactical force suitable for the
mission assigned by the divisional commander. This command struc-
ture proved to be more flexible; and delegating duties to the combat
command leaders released the division commander to plan the overall
strategy and command the reserve. 31 In 1940 and 1941 the Army and
officers associated with the armored divisions suffered from a lack
of experience handling large units because no large scale maneuvers
took place during the inter -war years. Armored officers had just
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participated in the first division maneuvers in 1940, while Germany
had fielded Corps level units in 1935.
The 1941 Army maneuvers produced field data that resulted in
some changes in the composition of the Armored divisions. The
Armored Force structure and mission was defined in 1942 with the
issuing of Field Manual 17-10; Armored Force Field Manual, Tactics
and Technique . This was the culmination of the United States'
peace-time experience with tanks. The purpose of the Armored Force
remained offensive combat as tank missions always had been. The
force was to operate by rapidly thrusting "... into vital parts of
the hostile rear followed by immediate exploitation to complete
enemy demoralization." 32 Infantry, artillery, engineers, and other
support units performed their previous functions.
Most changes affected the employment of tanks. The new tables
under regimental organization reduced the number of regiments to
two, each composed of three battalions. A significant change
occurred in the battalion composition. Wartime observations in
Europe and Africa acknowledged the shift to heavier tanks, which
resulted in regiments containing two battalions of medium tanks and
one battalion of light tanks. Light tanks became the light maneu-
vering element of the regiment, and the medium tanks comprised the
striking force. The manual continued the refinement of larger units
into an efficient fighting machine.
The role that armored divisions held within the Army was
different than German or Soviet armored units, and this role
prevented the development of a true operational doctrine. The Army
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fit armored divisions into its future war concept. FM 17-10 made a
distinction between missions of armored divisions and the GHQ tank
reserve: ". . . armored divisions are seldom used to effect the
actual operation of break-through. Their primary mission in such
operations is to push through the gap created and to exploit success
gained. GHQ reserve tank units operate with units detailed to
breach the hostile defenses.
"
33 Armored units were part of a
combined arms strategic doctrine that the Army established at all
levels of command. Armored Divisions and Corps were to be assigned
to predominately Infantry Corps or Armies. Unlike the Germans and
Soviets, no concentrated armored formations at Corps or Army levels
were to be employed. In combined arms doctrine a breach would be
made in enemy lines through which armored divisions would surge, a
mechanized cavalry to exploit the gap, to pursue the enemy, and
attack his reserves and lines of command and supply. The Army did
not adopt an operational doctrine to control units fighting in enemy
territory. It did develop general principles as guidelines for
tanks in the rare occasions when tanks did operate in enemy ter-
ritory. Since the Army was committed to combined arms warfare,
tanks would seldom be out of infantry and artillery support. From
the Infantry point of view, an operational doctrine was unnecessary.
The Army had the beginnings of an operational doctrine in mechanized
cavalry units and the Armored Force. The idea of employing forces
behind enemy lines was more acceptable to the Cavalry. The expan-
sion of mechanized cavalry forces reached the point by 1939-1940,
that officers began actively theorizing of employing large units in
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enemy territory. German campaigns in Poland and the West helped to
stimulate American thoughts about conducting mobile warfare and deep
battles. Yet, the Army's future war concept did not need a con-
centration of armored units, and the lack of large-scale field
maneuvers removed any catalyst to develop an operational doctrine.
The Army shaped tank doctrine to fit into its plan to employ large
infantry-dominated armies along parallel routes. The tank was seen
as a support weapon that could breach the line and bring decisive
strategic results by attacking the enemy's line of command and
supply. The American environment synthesized the infantry-based
close support doctrine with the cavalry exploitation doctrine to
produce a U.S. Army tank doctrine that continued to be refined by
mechanized cavalry, and later by armored divisions. 3 "*
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CONCLUSION
The evolution of the operational doctrine the of U.S. Armored
forces between 1917-1942 developed only within the conservative and
narrow parameters set by the Army's future war concept. The genesis
of American tank doctrine was an assimilation of British and French
theory. After the war, based on tank performance—as an infantry
support weapon—the Army's future war concept, and due to economics,
an independent Tank Corps was abolished. The Infantry was charged
with the responsibility for developing tanks and tank doctrine.
Under Infantry control these stagnated as only a support weapon to
assist the advance of the foot soldier. The Infantry clung to this
position until the Germans rolled through France and the Low
countries in May 1940.
Yet in the same period the technological performance of tank
improved and opened new possibilities concerning the employment of
tanks in combat. Faster tanks with a larger radius of operation
allowed the application of cavalry tactics to the tank. Prompted by
the British use of an Experimental Mechanized Force in 1927, the
U.S. Army began to study mechanization and created its own Ex-
perimental Mechanized Force in 1928. Acting upon these recommenda-
tions based on testing and the capabilities of new tanks, the Army
ventured on the path of an independent mechanized force. This only
served to spark branch rivalries between the Cavalry—which feared
being replaced by tanks and/or mechanized forces—and the Infantry
—
which feared losing control over tanks. In 1931, General Douglas
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MacArthur, the new Chief of Staff, sought to eliminate disputes
between the branches and to compel the Cavalry to undertake mechani-
zation. This new mechanization policy required all branches to
mechanize to the fullest extent. The Infantry would develop tanks
to better enable infantry to advance under fire from machine guns.
The Cavalry was to develop tanks that would assist the horse units
on the modern battlefield.
New and improved tanks being tested made the adaptation of
traditional cavalry principles to the tank plausible. While the
Infantry dealt with the better tactical mobility, the Cavalry
explored how and to what extent could mechanized units could replace
the horse. No one at this point contemplated the total elimination
of the horse. As mechanized cavalry units demonstrated their
potential, there was pressure to expand mechanized units size. But
in peacetime Army budgets were always tight, and mechanized units
had not displayed the results necessary to begin replacing horses
with tanks. The mechanized cavalry continued to demonstrate
tactical and strategic mobility in conducting operations. This led
to the conclusion that the best utilization of the Mechanized
Cavalry Brigade's mobility, firepower and shock power was not along
conventional cavalry employment but in an independent role. This
caused inter- and intra-branch rivalries to surface. Neither branch
desired to see the creation of an independent force, especially at
the expense of the units within their respective services.
By 1939 the 7th Cavalry Brigade (Mechanized) had become
proficient enough to take part in Army maneuvers. The Brigade had
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developed to a point that it was able to demonstrate its strategic
capability when it outflanked the opposing Army, deeply penetrating
its rear areas and disrupting its command, supply, and reserves.
The results of the exercise and the German invasion of Poland,
increased pressures for expansion. Mechanized Cavalry had already
been given the role of deep strategic penetrations, but it had not
yet been given the troops necessary to explore its full potential.
The German use of armored divisions caused a reexamination of Army
mechanized policies. The result was the formation of an improvised
Armored Division for the Third Army Maneuvers in 1940. The prin-
ciple upon which the division was based was adequately demonstrated
and more refinements were applied. The German success in France and
the Low Countries dispelled any reservations about the successful
employment of Armored divisions. At this point Army officials
unequivocally realized the need for the United States to organize
and employ larger tank formations. The Louisiana Maneuvers had
utilized every tank that the U.S. Army possessed.
There were a number of reasons why American operational
doctrine had lagged behind that of other countries. The parameters
of the American future war concept were sufficiently strong to keep
tank doctrine within its confines and indirectly eliminate the need
for an independent or armored force beyond the mission of exploiting
a gap produced by infantry with the support of other arms. Relegat-
ing the armored divisions to this role in 1941/42 also prevented the
continued expansion of a full operational doctrine. Branch rival-
ries continued throughout the interwar period to restrict doctrine
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from developing beyond the support of the different arms. The
refusal to expand mechanized units at the expense of foot soldiers
or horses kept the scale of mechanized units, therefore doctrine, on
the tactical level. The incentive to develop an operational
doctrine occurred when tanks were envisioned in independent roles of
conducting missions deep behind enemy lines. The first two times
the Army thought of independent tank units were at the end of World
War I (the Tank Corps), and with the Mechanized Force (1930-1931).
Both of these units were disbanded and their tanks integrated into
the Infantry and/or the Cavalry. The only period in which any
progress was made towards developing an operational doctrine was in
the late 1930s, under the direction of the Mechanized Cavalry
Brigade. The advances it did make were slow and against stiff
opposition.
The evolution of tank doctrine was impeded by the lack of a
suitable tank. Before the Ordnance Department could develop proper
tanks, it needed a clear mission statement. A vicious circle
existed, which because both of a shortage of funds and of the
decision to split armor development between the two politically
powerful branches in the U.S. Army, tank development stagnated.
Because of this there never were enough of the new tanks, nor enough
evolving designs in a learning period, to demonstrate what reliable
vehicles might accomplish. By 1934, technology produced engines
with greater horsepower, and reliable track and suspension systems
to create tanks that possessed the characteristics necessary to
conduct tank operations as Fuller and Liddell Hart advocated. Great
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Britain, Germany, and the Soviet Union adopted policies which took
more advantage of the tank's potential than did the United States or
France.
Conservatism within the Army, and the desire to fit tanks into
the e?';isting Army structure limited tank development. This was
increased as the Army pursued its future war concept. Given the
political, social, economic, and military climate of the times, the
evolution of the operational doctrine of U.S. Armored forces failed
to develop along lines that took best advantage of its theoretical
possibilities. Instead the U.S. Army sought to limit its develop-
ment within the traditional Army structure to participate in its
future war concept. The result was a unique evolution that was a
product of the American system.
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ABSTRACT
In general, my thesis demonstrated how the Army intended to use
tanks in combat, how that doctrine emerged, and some of the influ-
ences that shaped it. The unique environment in the United States
determined the direction of U.S. Army tank doctrine. During the
inter -war years, the Army planned to fight the "next war" with large
infantry armies advancing along parallel routes with support from
the other arms. My thesis is that it was not so much technology and
equipment, but, that branch rivalries, conservatism in the Army,
economics, and politics were the influential and motivating forces
that shaped American tank doctrine.
Both Mildred Gillie's Forging the Thunderbolt: A History of the
Development of the Armored Forces , and Timothy Nenninger's Master's
Thesis, "The Development of American Armor, 1917-1940" are solid,
general works on the origins and evolution of American armored
units, and the interrelationship between equipment organization,
doctrine, and politics. While both authors give an accurate account
of the formation of U.S. armored units, their presentations minimise
the development of doctrine. It is true that organization and
technology affect the formation of doctrine, but a detailed study of
the evolution of the operational doctrine of U.S. Armored Forces is
necessary for a more complete understanding of American armor
history. The expansion of U.S. Armored Forces has been sufficiently
detailed in existing literature, as noted in my bibliography.
My methodology is to establish a solid base in World War I tank
warfare from which to begin. From there, the reader was able to see
how American doctrine evolved and the controlling influences upon
it. U.S. tank theory had its foundations in British doctrine.
Major (later General) George S. Patton Jr. and General Sammuel D.
Rockenbach were the premier influences on American wartime and early
post-war doctrine. During the doldrums and stagnation of the 1920s
thinking was again stimulated by the British Experimental Mechanized
Force of 1927. From this emerged American experimentation with
mechanized cavalry units and new tank designs. The Infantry had
attained official control of tanks after World War I, but had
developed little theoretical work because it failed to accept the
tank as anything more than an infantry-support weapon. In 1931
mechanization policy was changed to apply mechanization gradually
throughout the Army. Both the Infantry and Cavalry experimented
with tank doctrine that best assisted them in performing their
traditional missions on the battlefield. Infantry tank doctrine
remained essentially unchanged. Mechanized Cavalry doctrine became
more mobile and independent as tank performance improved. Once
again the late 1930s and early 1940s saw U.S. tank doctrine and
organization hurriedly trying to catch up with the British, Germans,
and Soviets, while striving to fit armored units into the existing
Army structure.
Themes that emerged were that branch rivalries, economics,
politics, and the integration of new technology into an already
existing Army structure shaped the evolutionary path of operation
doctrine of U.S. Armored Forces in the period between 1917 and 1 94 1
.
Conservatism within the Army to use tanks as only support weapons to
assist the advance of large infantry armies along parallel routes
stifled theoretical development in the United States.
